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I. INTRODUCTION 
An old English proverb reads, “A woman, a dog, and a walnut tree/The more you beat 
the better they be.”1  This is illustrative of how society has historically viewed inflicting 
violence on women.  Unfortunately, this demeaning, degrading, and distorted view 
persists to this day.  Violence perpetrated against women because they are women 
occurs in every country, in every context, and in every culture.2  Gender-based violence 
(GBV) deprives women of their human rights, causes traumatic violations of their 
psychological and physical well-being, and contributes to the inequality that pervades 
our societies.  Despite the fact that GBV affects women from all races, religions and 
walks of life, there has been little tangible progress in its eradication.  Far from being 
eradicated, its ubiquity has been entrenched, validated, and ignored.  Violence against 
women (VAW) that occurs in times of conflict and post-conflict has received wider 
attention in recent years, in settings such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Kosovo; violence that is perpetrated in times of so-called peace, however, has, in many 
ways, fallen by the wayside in the public’s consciousness.  Nevertheless, in countries 
and settings that are not categorized as being in conflict, women are subjected to 
abhorrent instances of violence, frequently at the hands of intimate partners.  When we 
examine the rates at which GBV occurs in times of peace, this appellation appears to be 
a tragic misnomer – women as a group are subject to violence, deprivation of liberty, 
and their human rights are obfuscated in a manner that is characteristic of conflict 
situations.  A war may not have been expressly declared on women, but they still 
experience the brutality of conflict on a daily basis. 
Naomi Wolf, a political activist and leading feminist, recently wrote about the 
widespread consequences of gender inequality and VAW, commenting, 
If you are not innumerate, you can start a business. If you are not living in mortal 
fear of rape and beatings at home, you can organize your community to dig a 
new well. If you are not subjecting your daughter to traumatic genital injury at 
                                                          
1 As quoted in ‘Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence’ (1992-1993) 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1498 at 1498 
[Developments in the Law]. 
2 World Health Organization ‘Violence against women: Intimate partner and sexual violence against women’ (Fact Sheet No 239, 
September 2011), available: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs239/en/index.html, accessed 17 January 2012.   
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three and marrying her off at ten, she can go to school. And, when she does 
marry and has children of her own, they will benefit from two educated, employed 
parents, which means twice as much literate conversation in the home, twice the 
contacts, and twice the encouragement to succeed. Educated, pushy mothers 
make all the difference.3 
This statement demonstrates how multi-generational the effects of discrimination can 
be, and how many different forms GBV can take.  A seminal cause of this discrimination 
is that women enjoy a lower status than men in all countries (albeit, to different 
degrees), which is perpetuated and entrenched by inequality-spawning stereotypes and 
misperceptions of who women are, and what they are supposed to be.   
During the 17th Session of the Human Rights Council in June 2011, Navi Pillay, the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, stated that, “preventing violence from happening 
in the first place must be central to any strategy to eliminate violence against women.”4  
Traditionally, the focus of responses to GBV (if they exist) has been after-the-fact, in the 
form of civil protection orders, shelters, and counselling.5  Rarely have the underlying 
causes of why this violence is occurring, and why it is occurring at such high rates, been 
addressed.  A primary cause of violence based on gender, I argue, is stereotyping and 
ill-conceived misperceptions about gender roles.  As Rashida Manjoo, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, suggests, women who are empowered 
“understand that they are not destined to subordination and violence; they resist 
oppression; and they develop their capabilities as autonomous beings and they 
increasingly question the terms of their existence in both public and private spheres.”6  
By altering stereotypes and empowering women, GBV could be prevented from 
occurring in the first place, and discrimination and inequality could be mitigated or, 
hopefully, eradicated. 
                                                          
3 Naomi Wolf ‘A Gender Divided’ (30 September 2011) Project Syndicate, available: http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/wolf40/English, accessed 10 October 2011 [Wolf]. 
4 Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights ‘Prevention is the key to ending violence against women’ (5 July 2011), 
available: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/PreventionViolenceAgainstWomen.aspx, accessed 22 November 2011.   
5 Developments in the Law, supra note 1 at 1505. 
6 Ibid. 
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Women’s human rights, and women in general, have been consistently marginalized in 
international and regional binding documents.   This, in many ways, is a product of the 
stereotype that women are less important than men, and that their rights should 
therefore be accorded less significance – a twisted logic that only leads to women being 
further marginalized.  The hypothesis of this dissertation is that in order to eradicate 
GBV in times of so-called peace, it is essential that discriminatory stereotypes of women 
be altered.  This dissertation will examine stereotyping as an underlying cause of GBV, 
and whether the international and regional normative frameworks provide sufficient 
protections for women in regards to GBV.  There will also be discussion about whether 
or not States comply with the obligations that do exist, and how States have (or have 
not) altered the behaviours and attitudes which characterize a stereotyped view of 
gender roles. 
 
II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a comprehensive overview of GBV in times 
of so-called peace, with particularly attenti n being paid to the causal role stereotyping 
plays in perpetuating GBV.  The dissertation will also explore the relevant regional and 
international normative frameworks on this issue, as well as policy initiatives at the 
multi-national level.  This essay will include both a primary and a secondary literature 
review.  International and regional treaties are critiqued, as well as State reports to 
treaty bodies, and the treaty bodies’ response to these State reports.  Journal articles 
and relevant books will also play an important role in interpreting primary materials and 
in critically analysing their limitations and potential.  The scope of the dissertation will 
therefore be quite broad, and is intended to provide an inclusive examination of the 
disconnect that exists between States’ obligations under international law to eradicate 
GBV and alter the stereotypes which perpetuate violence against women, and the 
practical implementation of these laws and policies where they exist.   
The dissertation begins with a consideration of the context of GBV from its early 
historical origins.  The first chapter will also provide a discussion regarding how 
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stereotyping interacts with GBV and provide the foundation for the rest of the essay.  
The dissertation will then survey the forms and consequences of GBV, particularly vis-à-
vis violence that occurs in intimate relationships.  Attention will be paid to the 
psychological effects of GBV in particular.  The subsequent chapter of the dissertation 
will provide a basis for the underlying argument of this thesis - that stereotyping needs 
to urgently be addressed in order to effectively combat, and hopefully eradicate, GBV. 
Chapters VI and VII will survey the history and development of international and 
regional treaty body systems as they pertain to GBV.  Here, consideration will be paid 
both to how normative frameworks address (or fail to address) GBV, as well as to the 
role the drafters of international and regional legislation see stereotyping as playing in 
perpetuating and entrenching GBV.  The focus of the international legal framework 
discussion will be on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW), and its Committee.  The regional human rights bodies that 
will be examined are the African system, the Inter-American system, the European 
system, the South-East Asian (ASEAN) system and, finally, the Middle Eastern system. 
Chapter VIII provides an examination of the role the CEDAW Committee plays in the 
eradication of GBV and, in particular, how it has approached the issue of stereotyping 
under the Convention.  The mandate of the Committee will be discussed as a basis for 
analysing its General Recommendations, Concluding Observations and the State 
Reports it receives.  A detailed discussion will then follow regarding relevant CEDAW 
jurisprudence in the area of GBV and stereotyping.  Chapter IX will focus on the nature 
of States’ obligations to comply with international and regional law, with an emphasis 
being placed on the due diligence standard.  This chapter will examine both the nature 
of the substantive obligations of States, as well as the due diligence standard when it 
comes to assessing the degree to which States have fulfilled their substantive 
responsibilities. 
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III. CONTEXT OF GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE  
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat her with a stick, to pull her hair, choke 
her, spit in her face, or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities is not 
now acknowledged by our law. 
 – Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143, 146-47 (1871)7 
The historical origins of gender-based violence (GBV) can be traced as far back as is 
possible through recorded history.  During the reign of Romulus in Rome, in the 700s 
B.C., men had absolute rights to physically discipline their wives under the Law of 
Chastisement.  These laws included the “Rule of Thumb,” whereby a husband could 
beat his wife with a rod or switch as long as its circumference was no greater than the 
circumference of the base of the man’s rights thumb.8  In 1405, Christine de Pizan wrote 
The Book of the City of Ladies, in which she advocated for the better treatment of 
women in marriage.9  In the 1500s, the tradition of failing to recognize marital rape as 
an offence was entrenched in British jurisprudence.  According to the jurist Lord Hale, 
when a man and woman married, the woman gave her perpetual consent to sex, which 
could only be terminated through divorce.  Lord Hale wrote, “[t]he husband cannot be 
guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual 
matrimonial consent a contract with wife [sic] hath given herself in this kind to her 
husband, which she cannot retract.”10  This sanctioning of marital rape, while since 
rejected in many jurisdictions, continues to exist in many countries to this day; in 
Yemen, for example, men are free to beat their wives without any legal recourse 
available to women.11  
Clearly, GBV has been occurring for millennia, and remains legally sanctioned in some 
instances to this day.  Professor Vivian C. Fox writes that there are, 
                                                          
7 As quoted in Developments in the Law, supra note 1 at 1498. 
8 Minnesota Center against Domestic Violence and Abuse ‘Herstory of Domestic Violence: A Timeline of the Battered Women’s 
Movement’ (September 1999), available: http://www.mincava.umn.edu/documents/herstory/herstory.html, accessed 1 November 
2011.   
9 Ibid. 
10 As quoted in ibid. 
11 Wolf, supra note 3.   
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three bodies of thought [that] have influenced western society’s views and 
treatment of women: Judeo-Christian religious ideas, Greek philosophy and the 
Common Law legal code.  All three traditions have, by and large, assumed 
patriarchy as natural – that is male domination stemming from the view of male 
superiority.  As part of the culture perpetuated by these ideologies, violence 
towards women was seen as a natural expression of male dominance.12 
In other words, GBV has been entrenched as societally permissible through thousands 
of years of a fundamentally discriminatory assumption – that men are superior to 
women.  The ultimate cause of GBV, therefore, is a societal perception – perpetuated 
by every outlet imaginable, whether it is within the family or community, by the state, 
through the media – that women are somehow less than men, in every way.  Women 
are seen as weaker (both physically and mentally), less capable, less intelligent, and 
less worthy of respect than men.  The biological differences that exist between men and 
women have been exploited to make merit judgements on our relative value as human 
beings, and the rights that we should therefore be accorded.  This is done under the 
banner of culture, tradition, or necessity, all of which disguise the simple fact that 
women’s human rights are being obfuscated merely because of the right-holder’s 
gender.   
In times of so-called peace, GBV is traditionally seen within the context of intimate-
partner violence or violence which occurs with the home setting, although this is but one 
of many forms of GBV that exist.  The appellation usually used in regards to this form of 
violence – domestic violence – speaks volumes as to how society perceives GBV in 
times of so-called peace: a domestic affair, something that occurs in the home, that is 
private and beyond the reach of the law.  Qualifying the horrendous violence many 
women face at the hands of intimate partners as domestic minimizes the 
consequences, pervasiveness, and seriousness of that violence.  It also makes it more 
difficult to conceive of violence that occurs in the home as an international human rights 
issue.  Violence perpetrated in the home is still violence, and, as we shall see in 
chapters to follow, States still have an obligation to protect and promote women’s rights, 
whether violations happen in public or in private.  
                                                          
12 Vivian C. Fox ‘Historical Perspectives on Violence against Women’ (November 2002) 4 Journal of International Women’s Studies 
15 at 15. 
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So-called domestic violence is but one form of interpersonal violence.  Interpersonal 
violence more broadly can take various forms of abuse, namely economic, 
psychological, sexual, emotional, physical and verbal threats and actions.13  There are 
also institutional and structural aspects to violence in this context, which is “any form of 
structural inequality or institutional discrimination that maintains a woman in a 
subordinate position, whether physical or ideological, to other people within her family, 
household or community.”14 A recent report by the Special Rapporteur on violence 
against women, its causes and consequences, emphasizes that these two forms of 
violence – interpersonal and institutional/structural – invariably intersect.15 
 
An example of this intersection between interpersonal and institutional/structural 
aspects of violence, in this case taking the form of economic, emotional and 
psychological abuse, comes from the Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operative Co. case in the 
United States.16  Darlene Jespersen worked as a bartender at Harrah’s casino in Reno, 
Nevada, for twenty years.  Her performance was “exemplary,”17 with both customers 
and supervisors being content with her work.  In 2000, Harrah’s instituted a “Beverage 
Department Image Transformation” programme requiring that all bartenders – male or 
female - wear “a standard uniform and be well groomed, appealing to the eye, [and] be 
firm and body toned.”18  The requirements also contained gender-specific rules.  For 
men, it was short hair and trimmed fingernails.  For women, however, the regulations 
included that they had to have their hair “teased, curled, or styled every day and were 
also required to wear makeup – including foundation, blush, mascara, and lipstick – 
                                                          
13 Human Rights Council ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Rashida 
Manjoo’ (2 May 2011) at ¶ 25, available: http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/130/22/PDF/G1113022.pdf?OpenElement, accessed 20 October 2011.   
14 Ibid at ¶ 24.   
15 Ibid. 
16 Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co. 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Circuit, 2006).   
17 Ibid, as quoted in ‘Title VII – Gender Discrimination – Ninth Circuit Holds that Women can be Fired for Refusing to Wear Makeup’ 
(2006-2007) 120 Harv. L. Rev. 651 at 651 [Title VII]. 
18 Ibid. 
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every day.”19  Ms. Jespersen, who did not wear make up on or off the job, refused to 
comply with this regulation.  She claimed that being forced to wear make-up would 
make her feel “very degraded and demeaned,”20 and that doing so would affect her self-
dignity as well as taking away “her credibility as an individual and as a person.”21  Ms. 
Jespersen was, as a result, fired from her job. 
 
Ms. Jespersen sued Harrah’s for gender discrimination, “arguing that the appearance 
standards imposed unequal burdens on women and required women to conform to 
gender stereotypes.”22  The District Court of Nevada found that since men were also 
subject to appearance-based rules, women wearing make-up did not constitute an 
impermissible form of gender stereotyping.23 This decision was upheld by the Ninth 
Circuit court on appeal by a 7-4 vote.  The dissenting opinion at the appeal level, 
however, sheds some light on a deeper understanding of Ms. Jespersen’s case.  A 
dissenting judge focused on the disproportionate economic and time burdens that would 
be placed on women subject to the appearance standards at Harrah’s casino; while 
keeping your hair short and cutting your nails is inexpensive and necessitates relatively 
infrequent upkeep, applying make-up is a quotidian affair, and one that can cost a great 
deal of money – for which the women employees at Harrah’s were not compensated.24  
Unfortunately, however, this was not the line of reasoning that prevailed. 
 
While Ms. Jespersen’s case does not necessarily exemplify a form of violence in our 
typical understanding of the word, the emotional and psychological damage that it 
caused the plaintiff can be considered to constitute GBV, and cannot be minimized.  As 
Naomi Woolf points out, “focus on trivial concerns like makeup can result in shame, 
                                                          
19Title VII, supra note 14 at 651. 
20 Ibid at 152. 
21 Ibid. 
22 As quoted in ibid. 
23 Ibid.   
24 Ibid at 654. 
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guilt, and denial in women.”25  In a summary of the case, the Harvard Law Review 
commented, 
[g]ender inequality continues to permeate American culture.  Women are still 
underrepresented in positions of power. Harrah's is a company dominated by men.  
The makeup industry is similarly dominated by men. The federal judiciary is also 
dominated by men.  Perhaps because of the gross inequalities that pervade so 
much of American culture, the burdens imposed by makeup are underappreciated 
by employers, the makeup industry, and the federal judiciary alike. Hopefully, as we 
continue to progress toward gender equality, the harms imposed on women will 
receive greater recognition, and the federal judiciary may just be the best place to 
start.26 
The institutional aspect of violence, and its intersection with an interpersonal aspect, is 
evident here.  Not only was Ms. Jespersen’s personhood and sense of self violated, but 
so was her ability to advance within the institutional framework – both of which were 
based on the immutable fact that Ms. Jespersen is a woman.  What can be gleaned 
from cases such as these is the inextricable link between GBV and discrimination. 
Conceptualizing GBV as a human rights violation requires us to take a more creative 
view of human rights instruments.  Clearly, GBV is a violation of the right to life and 
security of the person but, given its broad definition that goes beyond physical violence, 
it is important to view GBV not only as an act of violence, but as a form of 
discrimination.  This broadens the scope and substance of States’ obligations vis-à-vis 
GBV because non-discrimination is a right under many human rights instruments.  
CEDAW, for example, does not contain any provisions that are specifically aimed at 
eradicating violence against women, but it does contain a non-discrimination clause.  
The CEDAW Committee has explicitly defined GBV as a form of discrimination, 
however, in its General Recommendation 19: “[g]ender-based violence is a form of 
discrimination that seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a 
basis of equality with men.” 27   
                                                          
25 As quoted in ibid at 657. 
26 Title VII, supra note 17 at 658. 
27 Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women ‘General Recommendation 19 – Violence against 
women’ (11
th Session, 1992), available: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#recom19 
[CEDAW GR 19]. 
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The violent acts themselves are not the only sources of discrimination when it comes to 
the concept of GBV.  National laws to punish the perpetrators of VAW are equally 
discriminatory.  In Palestine, for example,  
[m]en convicted of honour killings get a maximum sentence of six months 
imprisonment if caught and prosecuted. There are no specific domestic violence 
laws only general assault charges. A woman has to be hospitalised for at least 10 
days to press serious assault charges and she requires the testimony of two 
witnesses who are not related. Furthermore, rape is not recognised as a crime within 
marriage.28   
The genesis of these and other discriminatory laws is the differentiated value accorded 
to women and men.  Mashoor Basissy, director of the Palestinian Authority Ministry for 
Women’s Affairs, explains,  
As a Palestinian man I have to tell you that women are not regarded as equals in our 
society. The courts enable the male perpetrators of domestic violence and honour 
killings to get off very lightly if they are even brought to justice in the first place which 
is unlikely in most of the cases.  It is also regarded as shameful to involve the 
authorities in what is considered a private family affair. Women are embarrassed to 
report the abuse because they know that nothing will happen. Even female relatives 
take the side of the male perpetrators in many instances.  Furthermore, if the victim 
antagonises the family by getting the police involved, divorce often follows. Few 
Palestinian women are able to support themselves economically as only a minority 
of women here work and a woman living alone is subject to rumours about sexual 
fidelity which again could endanger her and make her a target for attacks.29 
This illustrates how women, as a result of an underlying societal assumption that they 
are inferior, face discrimination in all aspects of their lives.  Mr. Basissy acknowledges 
that while legislative and policing reforms can assist in the protection of women 
suffering from GBV in the home, there “needs to be a sea-change in the attitude of 
people here [in Palestine].”30 
GBV, as we have seen, is a complex issue that exists in a context wherein women are 
not seen as being equal to men.  As such, not only are women discriminated against in 
                                                          
28 Mashoor Basissy ‘Women are not equals in our society’ (8 April 2009) IPS News, available: 
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=46436, accessed 22 November 2011.   
29 Ibid.   
30 Ibid.   
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the form of punches, kicks, and verbal abuse, but they also face discrimination within 
the legal system.  The socio-legal setting perpetuates cycles of violence against women 
and, in a way, condones these acts as being manifestations of the very stereotypes they 
are based on.  Before we examine the issue of stereotyping further, however, let us first 
consider the forms and consequences of GBV in order to gain a broader of 
understanding of the topic at hand.   
 
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE 
He always took great care to hit me on places where it would not show: on my 
torso or where my head was covered with hair, so that our friends and family 
would not see it and ask questions. […]After the three years were over, I 
wanted to study and get a part-time job. That was when he also started to 
beat my face. I missed my oral entry exam, and I started to miss whole weeks 
from work because I could not have gone to work with black eyes, or a 
swollen nose. It would have been so shameful! Eventually I was fired, as the 
company could not afford to have an employee missing work week after week 
with no plausible explanation. 
- Domestic violence victim, NANE Hotline, Hungary31 
Article 1 of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (DEVAW) 
defines violence against women as, “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or 
is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, 
including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether 
occurring in public or in private life.”32  This definition comprises two important elements: 
firstly, that the violence must be gender-based, meaning that not every act of violence 
that a woman experiences qualifies as VAW, but rather that the violence in question 
must be related in some way to the victim’s gender; and, secondly, that the violence can 
include anything that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological 
harm or suffering to women.   
                                                          
31 Council of Europe ‘Gender Matters: Chapter II, Gender-based Violence,’ available: 
http://www.eycb.coe.int/gendermatters/chapter_2/1.html, accessed 19 December 2011.   
32 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, General Assembly resolution 48/104 of 20 December 1993, available: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/eliminationvaw.htm, accessed 11 November 2011 [DEVAW]. 
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The consequences of GBV range from social impacts to psychological and physical 
consequences to occupational effects.  Many of these consequences are interrelated 
and interlinked, so it is important to remember that while the immediate effect of a 
violent act may be a certain set of conditions, others may ensue as a result.  The effects 
of sexual violence, for example, include social consequences, such as rejection by 
one’s husband/family/community and exclusion from school and jobs, psychological 
consequences, such as fear, depression, and feelings of shame and guilt, as well as 
physiological consequences, namely pain, sexual dysfunctions, conversion disorders, 
and somatic illnesses.33  Other consequences include post-traumatic stress disorder, 
memory disorders, dissociation symptoms, confusion, behavioral changes, eating 
disorders and substance abuse disorders.34  In addition to the social, psychological and 
physiological effects, GBV can, in its most severe forms, result in death and permanent 
disability.  The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that violence against 
women causes more death and disability among women aged fifteen to forty-four than 
cancer, malaria, traffic accidents, and war.35  They also pointed out that sexual violence, 
including martial rape, is a major cause of the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS among 
women.36  
 
In her seminal 1979 text The Battered Woman, Leonore Walker describes the 
psychological manipulation that can occur in addition to physical abuse in the context of 
intimate partner violence, in order to explain why women do not always remove 
themselves from situations of intimate partner violence.  This theory contains various 
phases, whereby there is a build-up to a violent attack,37 followed by the violence 
itself,38 and ending with a “kindness and contrite loving behaviour phase.”39 
                                                          
33 Lisa Davis ‘Still Trembling: State Obligation under International Law to End Post-Earthquake Rape in Haiti’ (2010-2011) 65 U. 
Miami L. Rev. 867 at 884-885 [Post-Earthquake Rape]. 
34 Ibid.  
35 As quoted by Human Rights Watch ‘World Report 2000: Women’s Human Rights,’ available: 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k/Wrd.htm#TopOfPage, accessed 29 October 2011. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Leonore Walker The Battered Woman (1979) at 56. 
38 Ibid at 64.   
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Walker’s theory was exemplified when the former UN Special Rapporteur on Violence 
against Women, Radhika Coomaraswamy, visited Brazil in 1996 as part of her 
mandate.  There, she met Cleonica, a 27-year-old domestic worker from Montes Claros, 
who lived with her unemployed husband and their three children.  Accusing Cleonica of 
being unfaithful to him each time she left the house, the husband became physically 
and verbally abusive.  Cleonica, who was reluctant to leave her husband despite his 
beatings, eventually lost her job when her employer noticed extensive bruising over her 
entire body, and asked her not to return to work.40  According to Cleonica, her husband 
would cry and beg for forgiveness on his knees after each attack.41  Ms. 
Coomaraswamy writes, “Cleonica spoke of an almost cyclical pattern in her husband’s 
behaviour: 3 days of violence, followed by 3 days of care; or 15 days of violence 
followed by 15 days of love and care.”42 
In terms of the consequences of GBV from a rights-based perspective, the CEDAW 
Committee provides a non-exhaustive list of the human rights that are nullified or 
impaired by GBV: the right to life; the right not to be subject to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; the right to equal protection according 
to humanitarian norms in times of internati nal or internal armed conflict; the right to 
liberty and security of person; the right to equal protection under the law; the right to 
equality in the family; the right to the highest standard attainable of physical and mental 
health; and the right to just and favorable conditions of work.43  Clearly, GBV can affect 
every aspect of a woman’s life, from the psychological to the physical to her enjoyment 
of human rights.  With such all-encompassing and traumatic consequences, it is 
shocking that VAW continues to be so pervasive around the world; there are, however, 
equally deeply entrenched causal factors that permit and perpetuate GBV. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
39 Ibid at 65. 
40 UN Economic and Social Council ‘Report on the mission of the Special Rapporteur to Brazil on the issue of domestic violence’ 
(15-26 July 1996) at ¶ 10, available: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G97/102/46/PDF/G9710246.pdf?OpenElement, 
accessed 12 November 2011.   
41 Ibid at ¶ 11.   
42 Ibid.     
43 CEDAW GR 19, supra note 27.   
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V. STEREOTYPING AS AN UNDERLYING CAUSE OF GENDER-BASED 
VIOLENCE 
Our culture needs to change – teach people not to rape, not how not to be raped. 
- Rhiannon Frame, Slutwalk London protester, 201144 
 
The definition of a stereotype is difficult to ascertain in precise terms.  The Oxford 
Dictionary defines ‘stereotype’ as, “a widely held but fixed and oversimplified image or 
idea of a particular type of person or thing.”45  Stereotypes contain both descriptive and 
normative elements – in other words, what people are and what they supposedly should 
be.46  Rebecca Cook and Simone Cusack explain, “a stereotype presumes that all 
members of a certain social group possess particular attributes (e.g., adolescents are 
irresponsible), or perform specified roles (e.g., women are caregivers).”47  Stereotypes 
can be positive or negative in value, but are problematic in that they apply to all 
members of a particular group, and the normative element of stereotyping means that 
members of the group that do not conform to the stereotyped notion are seen as 
aberrations or deviant.  For example, women are stereotypically seen as being mothers 
and carers; women who chose not to have children are perceived by some as being un-
womanly, less feminine, or even less female.  Having children does not make you a 
woman, however; a reproductive choice does not change one’s sex.  And yet many 
cultures, which include members from every socio-economic group, religion, ethnicity 
and nationality, have constructed this notion that to be a woman is to be a mother.   
Establishing a causal link between stereotyping and GBV is challenging for a number of 
reasons, and little academic attention has been paid specifically to this issue in the past.  
As Cook and Cusack point out, “because such violence has long been constructed as a 
“normal” part of gender relations, we have difficulty in identifying how gender 
                                                          
44 As quoted by Sarah Bell ‘Slutwalk London: Yes means yes and no means no’ (11 June 2011) BBC News, available: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13739876, accessed 20 January 2012 [Slutwalk]. 
45 Angus Stevenson (ed) Concise Oxford Dictionary of English 12 ed (2011).   
46 Rebecca J. Cook and Simone Cusack Gender Stereotyping: Transnational Legal Perspectives (2010) at 9-38 [Cook and Cusack].  
47 Ibid at p. 9.   
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stereotypes contribute to its practice.”48 In a Shadow Report to the CEDAW Committee 
in 2006 regarding Mexico’s State Report, NGOs argued that, “a big difficulty for the 
attention and prevention of violence against women is that it appears as culturally 
neutralized, as an intrinsic characteristic of the social relations and accepted gender 
model.”49  In other words, these discriminatory perceptions are so entrenched in 
society’s view of women that they take on a quality that allows those who perpetuate the 
stereotypes to say that these are not stereotypes at all, but rather universal realities.  
This is why, in my view, it is so important to isolate precise stereotypes that are 
discriminatory towards women so that they can be addressed in such a way that they 
are seen as having no merit.  We may not even be aware of the stereotypes that have 
shaped us and our view of gender roles, and only by parsing out those stereotypes can 
we truly see their discriminatory nature, and how they might have a causal link with 
GBV.   
In 2011, protests were conducted all around the world after a Toronto policeman told a 
group of university students that they should “avoid dressing like sluts” in order to 
prevent being assaulted.50  This is an example of how stereotypes and GBV share a 
causal link: the subtext to the policeman’s comments is that women should dress a 
certain way and that, if they do not, they are in some way consenting to being sexually 
assaulted.  The stereotype being advanced is that ‘good women’ dress modestly and 
‘bad women’ dress provocatively, and that the two should be, or will be, treated 
accordingly.  Victim-blaming is one way that the stereotypes that allow GBV to occur in 
the first place at such high rates are entrenched.   
A case heard by the Supreme Court of Canada illustrates how stereotyped perceptions 
of how women should or should not act can contribute to how allegations of rape, a form 
of GBV, are approached by the authorities.  In the R. v. Ewanchuck,51 Steve Ewanchuck 
was accused of sexually assaulting a 17-year-old woman whom he was interviewing for 
                                                          
48 Cook and Cusack, supra note 46 at 41-42. 
49 Ibid at 42. 
50 Slutwalk, supra note 44.   
51 R. v. Ewanchuck [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330 (Supreme Court of Canada). 
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a job.  She initially explicitly refused Mr. Ewanchuk’s sexual advances, but did not take 
further action because she was afraid for her life.52  The Supreme Court of Canada 
castigated the lower court’s decision to acquit Mr. Ewanchuck on the basis that the 
complainant’s eventual failure to object to the accused’s sexual advances constituted 
implied consent.  The Court of Appeals judge held that, “the sum of the evidence 
indicates that Ewanchuk’s advances to the complainant were far less criminal than 
hormonal”53 and suggested that the fact that the complainant was not dressed 
particularly modestly was relevant to the case.54  The Supreme Court overturned the 
acquittal, and used the opportunity to “[uncover] and name numerous sexual 
stereotypes.”55 Justice L’Heureux-Dubé enumerated various sexual stereotypes about 
women in her concurring opinion: that women are sexually passive and, therefore, they 
are disposed submissively to surrender to men’s sexual advances; women should 
physically resist sexual assault and, therefore, failure to resist on the part of a female 
complainant signals consent to sexual activities; women should dress modestly and, 
therefore, an immodestly dressed woman is responsible for her own sexual assault; 
and, finally, that women are in a state of perpetual consent to sexual activity and, 
therefore, when a woman says ‘no’ to sexual activities she does not really mean it.56  
This case was demonstrative of the stereotypes many people hold of women, and the 
Appeals Court decision is illustrative of the attitude many courts take towards women 
who allege that they are the victims of sexual assault. 
Stereotypes of gender roles exist in many different forms, but are based on the notion 
that women are inferior to men by virtue of their gender.  This misperception manifests 
itself in many different ways, both covert and overt, and is so deeply entrenched in 
every aspect of our social organization that they are difficult to identify at times. Cook 
and Cusack argue,  
                                                          
52 Ibid at headnote. 
53 As quoted in ibid at ¶92. 
54 As quoted in ibid at ¶88. 
55 Cook and Cusack, supra note 46 at 52.   
56 Ibid at 52-53. 
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the structure and organization of society is built on gender stereotypes, hence 
ensuring that existing unequal power relations between sexes are sustained.  
Subordination and exclusion of women takes place through the uncritical 
application of stereotyped (often traditional and implicit) ideas, symbols, and 
roles.57 
This notion was elucidated upon in an article by Cecilia Ridgeway and Shelley Correll, 
who argue that, 
gender is an institutionalized system of social practices for constituting people as 
two significantly differ categories, men and women, and organizing social 
relations of inequality on the basis of that difference.58 
Social psychologists have opined that, “[m]en are viewed as more status worthy and 
competent overall at the things that “count most” […]. Women are seen as less 
competent in general but “nicer” and better at communal tasks even though these tasks 
themselves are less valued.”59  In other words, while the stereotyped roles and 
behaviours accorded to women are not necessarily negative – women are, after all, 
seen as warmer than men60 - the underlying theme is one of comparative inferiority and 
incompetence at tasks that hold social and economic value.   
One expression of this power imbalance is patriarchy, a form of social organization 
where a male is, “the supreme authority in the family, clan, or tribe, and descent is 
reckoned in the male line, with the children belonging to the father’s clan or tribe.”61 This 
is the notion behind children having their father’s last name, or nationality being 
bestowed based on the father’s citizenship.  Patriarchy, while not the sole manifestation 
of gender stereotypes based on unequal power, is an important contributing factor to 
GBV, particularly in the domestic setting.  Gloria Steinem wrote that, “patriarchy 
requires violence or the subliminal threat of violence in order to maintain itself. […] The 
                                                          
57 Cook and Cusack, supra note 46 at 2. 
58 Cecilia L. Ridgeway and Shelley J. Correll ‘Unpacking the Gender System: A Theoretical Perspective on Gender Beliefs and 
Social Relations’ (August 2004) 18:4 Gender and Society 510 at 510.   
59 Ibid at 513. 
60 Susan T. Fiske et al. ‘A Model of (Often Mixed Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow from Perceived 
Status and Competition’ (June 2002) 82:6 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 878 at 880. 
61 Charles E. Corry ‘The Role of Patriarchy in Domestic Violence’ (2002) Equal Justice Foundation, available: 
http://www.ejfi.org/DV/dv-77.htm, accessed 30 November 2011. 
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most dangerous situation for a woman is not an unknown man in the street, or even the 
enemy in wartime, but a husband or lover in the isolation of their own home.”62  The 
stereotypes that fuel patriarchy, and allow it to fester, are at the heart of the reason why 
GBV continues to be prevalent in every country in the world. 
In his ground-breaking cross-cultural study of domestic violence, David Levinson 
recorded incidences of GBV in each of the cultures he examined.  Nevertheless, he 
discovered that patterns of domestic violence, both low and high, had a correlational 
relationship with patterns of dominance between husbands and wives.  Levinson 
reported that societies that had lower incidences of family violence were generally 
characterized by shared decision making, wives’ control of at least some of the family’s 
resources, equal access to divorce for men and women, no premarital sex double 
standard, monogamous marriage, marital cohabitation, peaceful conflict resolution 
within and outside the home, and immediate social responses to domestic violence.63  
He notes that, “shared decision making in the household predicts the absence of wife 
beating [and that] we already know that male dominance in decision making predicts 
wife beating.”64  While patriarchal and matriarchal societies are difficult to define in 
precise terms, Levinson’s study shows that domestic violence occurs at much lower 
levels in societies with a more egalitarian power-sharing structure between the genders, 
and would suggest that if stereotypes of women’s role in marriages were challenged, 
that there would be a corresponding decrease in the levels of GBV in the home. 
The relationship between GBV and stereotyping is multi-faceted and complex.  On the 
one hand, stereotypes can be used as a reason for committing GBV - as was the case 
with Cleonica, whose husband accused her of being unfaithful, which is not in keeping 
with the stereotype of the dutiful wife, and used this belief as a reason to physically and 
verbally assault his wife.  Stereotypes can be a reason why women do not report their 
abusers to the police - women are supposed to be docile, deferential and subservient to 
their male partners.  Stereotypes can also be why women who do report incidents of 
                                                          
62 Ibid. 
63 David Levinson Family Violence in Cross-cultural Perspective (1989) at 103. 
64 Ibid. 
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GBV do not find solace through the judicial system; many so-called legal protections are 
rife with stereotype.  Legislation, therefore, plays an important role in the perpetuation of 
stereotypes.  As Cook and Cusack argue,  
a law, policy or practice that applies, enforces or perpetuates a gender 
stereotype might burden women when it restricts them to culturally acceptable 
roles or behaviour, such as motherhood, or, for example, when it stigmatizes or 
punishes women for their failure to conform to such roles or behaviours.65 
The most glaring example is the law surrounding sexual assault in many countries.  In 
countries as diverse as Mongolia, Botswana, and Morocco, a man is free to force sex 
on a woman, provided that she is his wife.  In Tanzania, so-called spousal or marital 
rape is only outlawed if the couple is legally separated.   In Saudi Arabia, described by 
some as being in a state of gender apartheid,66 a 19-year woman was recently 
sentenced to 200 lashes and six months in prison after being gang-raped by seven 
men, who recorded the attack on their mobile phones.67  The woman was charged for 
violating the “illegal mingling” law, as she was riding in a car with an unrelated male 
acquaintance before the attack occurred.68   
These laws and sentences illustrate deep underlying (mis)perceptions about how 
women ‘should’ behave.  They contravene a foundational tenet of the supreme 
instrument of international law, the UN Charter, which stands for the promotion of, and 
respect for, “human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language, or religion.”69  At the international level, non-discrimination and 
equality clauses have been included in the relevant instruments and, more recently, 
regional instruments have also begun to take prominence in this area, as well as in the 
                                                          
65 Cook and Cusack, supra note 46 at 63.   
66 Mona Eltahawy ‘Punished for being Raped’ (29 November 2007) The New York Times, available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/29/opinion/29iht-edeltahawy.1.8528543.html, accessed 22 November 2011.   
67 The woman was later pardoned by King Abdullah after mass international public outcry. See ‘Saudi Courts – Women’s Rights – 
General Court of Qatif Sentences Gang-Rape Victim to Prison and Lashings for Violating “Illegal Mingling” Law’ (2007-2008) 121 
Harv. L. Rev. 2254 at 2254. 
68 Ibid. 
69 United Nations Charter (1945), available: http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml, accessed 11 November 2011 
[UN Charter].   
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areas of stereotyping and GBV more specifically.  The following chapter will examine 
regional normative frameworks from a variety of different geographical regions.   
 
VI. REGIONAL NORMATIVE FRAMEWORKS  
From a humanistic standpoint, the European, Inter-American and African 
human rights regimes hold out great promise.  However favorably or 
unfavorably they may compare to some ideal human rights system or to each 
other, the rights they recognize, the institutions they establish and the 
procedures they prescribe add up to an assault on the global state 
sovereignty that is of truly historical proportions.70 
-Burns H. Weston et al., 1987 
In recent years, regional human rights treaty bodies have assumed an important role in 
the protection and promotion of human rights.  The European system, first established 
in the aftermath of World War II, is the oldest system; the sub-regional system for South 
East Asian states is the newest system.  The African and Inter-American systems have 
also made valuable contributions to the furtherance of human rights for all, both in terms 
of jurisprudence and in terms of the substantive provisions in their normative 
frameworks.  I will also consider the nascent human rights system that exists in the 
Middle East, as well as a brief discussion regarding those States which are not a party 
to any relevant regional human rights instruments.   
i. AFRICA  
The principal regional human rights instrument in the African region is the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Banjul Charter),71 which was drafted by 
members of the Organisation of African Unity (now known as the African Union).  The 
Charter was unanimously approved in 1981, and entered into effect on 21 October 
1986.  The Charter was originally overseen and adjudicated by the African Commission 
                                                          
70 Burns H. Weston, Robin Ann Lukes & Kelly M. Hnatt ‘Regional Human Rights Regimes: A Comparison and Appraisal’ (1987) 20:4 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 585 at 614 [Weston et al.]  
71 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986), available: 
http://www.africa-union.org/official_documents/treaties_%20conventions_%20protocols/banjul%20charter.pdf, accessed 27 October 
2011 [Banjul Charter]. 
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on Human and People’s Rights in Banjul, and currently has fifty-three States Parties.72  
In 1998, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) was created, but 
was subsequently incorporated into the African Court of Justice (ACJ).  The relationship 
between the Court and the Commission is not entirely clear as of yet - the Africa Court 
of Justice and Human Rights Protocol simply provides that, “the Court shall bear in mind 
the complementarity it maintains with the African Commission.”73  The logistical opacity 
regarding the respective mandates of the Court and the Commission do not alter the 
significance or provisions of the Banjul Charter, although it may lead to duplication or 
confusion, particularly on the part of complainants.  Furthermore, the Banjul Charter 
does not imbue the ACHPR with the power to grant remedies to redress the violations 
nor to enforce its orders.74  It can receive communications from States, but also 
considers communications from non-State entities, although thr ugh a slightly different 
procedure.75 The Court, however, might have the latitude to go further than receiving 
communications, and actually grant remedies and enforce its rulings. 
At first glance, the Banjul Charter looks like a hopeful step forward in ensuring equal 
rights for men and women in Africa.  Article 2 of the Charter states, “[e]very individual 
shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed 
in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, color, 
sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, 
birth or other status.”76  When we examine the Charter more closely, however, it 
becomes clear that it has several shortfalls.  In the Preamble, for example, there is a 
clause that states that “the virtues of historical tradition and the values of African 
                                                          
72 African Union ‘List of Countries which have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the African Union Convention on African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights,’ available: http://www.achpr.org/english/ratifications/ratification_african%20charter.pdf, accessed 28 
November 2011.   
73 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (1 July 2008), at article 27, available: http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/text/Protocol%20on%20the%20Merged%20Court%20-%20EN.pdf, accessed 27 October 
2011.  
74 Danwood Chirwa ‘African Regional Human Rights System: The Promise of Recent Jurisprudence on Social Rights’ in Malcolm 
Langford (ed) Social Rights jurisprudence: Emerging trends in international and comparative law (2008) at 335. 
75 Banjul Charter, supra note 71 at art. 55. 
76 Ibid at article 2.  
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civilization” must be taken into consideration when interpreting the Charter.  Historical 
traditions and values are, however, some of the very things that have contributed to a 
usurpation of women’s rights in Africa and elsewhere for centuries by promulgating 
gendered stereotypes.  As one commentator put it, “when the Charter is compared with 
the other regional human rights instruments, it clearly fails to measure up in terms of 
enforcement capabilities as a protector of the human rights of African men and women 
alike.”77   
One of the most significant clauses relevant to GBV is article 55, which stipulates that, 
“the State shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and also 
ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and the child as stipulated in 
international declarations and conventions.”78  This is important in two regards; firstly, 
article 55 provides that every discrimination must be eliminated, therefore including 
GBV, and, secondly, that international declarations are made binding by proxy.  This, 
however, is where the positive aspects of the Banjul Charter in regard to the eradication 
of GBV and in the altering of the stereotypes which perpetuate this violent form of 
discrimination end. 
Article 27 of the Charter provides that, “[e]very individual shall have duties towards his 
family and society, the State and other legally recognized communities and the 
international community.” Article 29(1) goes on to say that, “[t]he individual shall also 
have the duty [- to] preserve the harmonious development of the family and to work for 
the cohesion and respect of the family.”79  These articles seemingly imply that the 
cohesion and harmony of a family is paramount to other considerations.  This could be 
interpreted in such a manner that reporting or pursuing a perpetrator of GBV could be 
seen as a violation of articles 27 and 29(1) as it would be disruptive to the cohesion and 
harmony of a family.  These Charter provisions go one step further by saying that every 
individual has a duty towards his or her family, and that a duty also exists to preserve 
                                                          
77 Deborah A. Wean ‘Real Protection for African Women? The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (1998) 2 Emory J. 
Int’l Disp. Resol. 426 at 455 [Wean]. 
78 Banjul Charter, supra note 71 at art. 18. 
79 Ibid at Chapter II: Duties.   
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the harmonious development and cohesiveness of the family – thus, a woman who 
reported a violent husband, for example, would be acting contrary to human rights law, 
as provided for in the Banjul Charter.  Conversely, an argument could be made that 
GBV that occurs within a family context could be a violation of articles 27 and 29(1) 
insofar as the violence women suffer is highly disruptive to the harmony of the family.  
My concern, however, is that while a strong argument could be made in support of 
women’s rights by relying on articles 27 and 29(1), in practice I believe that the first 
scenario I outlined would take precedence.  As one scholar astutely points out, “while 
specific rights of women are protected under the [Banjul] Charter, their inclusion with the 
protection of the family provisions may result in problems when individual women come 
in conflict with local community standards or the desires of their more traditional 
husbands.”80 
There is no mention made in the Banjul Charter about altering stereotypes.  In fact, 
article 29(7) seems to entrench pre-existing values, to which faulty gender stereotypes 
are linked: “[t]he individual shall also have the duty [- to] preserve and strengthen 
positive African cultural values in his relations to other members of the society, in the 
spirit of tolerance, dialogue and consultati n and, in general, to contribute to the 
promotion of the moral well-being of society.”81  The issue with this provision is not that 
it expressly allows for GBV to occur in the spirit of culture, but rather that it could be 
used to further entrench gender role stereotypes, namely of women being subservient 
and domestically-bound.   The phrase ‘moral well being of society’ is particularly 
troublesome, since the notion of morality differs between people and is often 
constructed in its most tangible sense by men – a woman who chose not to have 
children, or who was a lesbian, for example, might be seen as denigrating positive 
African cultural values, and leading a life that was contrary to the moral well-being of 
society.   
In 1995, under pressure from civil society, the African Union began drafting the Protocol 
to the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa.  
                                                          
80 Wean, supra note 77 at 450.   
81 Banjul Charter, supra note 71 at art. 29(7). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
25 
 
 
 
This Protocol, otherwise known as the Maputo Protocol, entered into effect in November 
2005, and is much more progressive than the Banjul Charter when it comes to women’s 
rights.  At present, out of the fifty three states of the African Union, only twenty eight 
states have actually ratified the Protocol.  This is illustrative of the lack of political will 
and commitment that the Protocol – and, by extension, women’s human rights – has 
attracted.  Nevertheless, the Maputo Protocol represents an important step forward in 
the protection and promotion of women’s human rights in Africa, and its provisions offer 
a glimpse of what could be for the female citizens of African Union member states. 
The Maputo Protocol imposes positive obligations on States to adopt and enforce laws 
and other measures that prohibit all forms of VAW.82   Articles 3(4) and 4(2) integrally 
link the rights to life, integrity and security of the person, as well as the right to dignity, 
with the eradication of GBV, whether the acts in question occur in private or in public. 
The Maputo Protocol is also progressive in the manner in which is acknowledges and 
addresses the issue of stereotyping, and goes so far as to offer specific ways to deal 
with this issue.  Under the Protocol, States Parties have an obligation to,  
[c]ommit themselves to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of 
women and men through public education, information, education and 
communication strategies, with a view to achieving the elimination of harmful 
cultural and traditional practices and all other practices which are based on the 
idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes, or on stereotyped 
roles for women and men.83 
This is important because it goes to the very heart of ultimate cause of GBV - the 
systemic structures and attitudes enshrined from birth in a diversity of cultures and 
settings.   
The Maputo Protocol also offers specific ways in which to address the issue of 
stereotyping.  Article 4, which deals with the rights to life, integrity and security of the 
person, stipulates that States, 
                                                          
82 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (entered into force 25 November 
2005), at articles 3(4) and 4(2), available: http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/Protocol%20on%20the%20Rights%20of%20Women.pdf, accessed 22 November 2011 
[Maputo Protocol].   
83Maputo Protocol, supra note 82 at art. 2. 
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shall take appropriate and effective measures to […] actively promote peace 
education through curricula and social communication in order to eradicate 
elements in traditional and cultural beliefs, practices and stereotypes which 
legitimise and exacerbate the persistence and tolerance of violence against 
women. […]84 
Furthermore, States Parties must “eliminate all stereotypes in textbooks, syllabuses and 
the media that perpetuate such discrimination.”85 
Education has been selected, it seems, as the most appropriate way for States to 
address the stereotypes which contribute to societies that are willfully blind to the 
consequences of GBV.  This is undoubtedly an important tool, and one that 
governments could realistically enact, but the difficulty lies with its inability to be 
measured concretely – what constitutes an appropriate and effective measure? 
Moreover, if a child is not inculcated with stereotypes at school, but lives in a home or a 
community where gender stereotypes are insidious, then the neutrality of the child’s 
schooling on the issue of gender may be trumped by the relationships and stereotypes 
he or she faces outside of school.  Nevertheless, the Maputo Protocol represents a 
valiant effort, and an express acknowledgement by the African region that in order to 
effectively tackle GBV, stereotyping must be addressed.  
ii. THE AMERICAS  
The Organization of American States (OAS) was established on 30 April 1948, with the 
adoption of the OAS Charter. In 1959, the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (IACHR) was created and has, since its inception, been the primary body 
responsible for overseeing conformity with the OAS Charter, the American Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties of Man, and the American Convention on Human Rights.  In 
1979, the IACHR was joined by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), 
which is mandated to enforce and interpret the provisions of the American Convention 
on Human Rights, with both advisory and adjudicatory functions.  The IACHR can, 
along with States Parties, refer cases to the IACtHR; its decision to do so is based on 
                                                          
84 Ibid at art. 4(2)(d). 
85 Ibid at art. 12(1)(b).   
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the “the best interests of human rights in the Commission’s judgement.”86  The IACtHR 
and IACHR also oversee the first treaty specifically focused on VAW, and the most 
widely-ratified human rights instrument in the Inter-American system, the Inter-American 
Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women, 
more commonly referred to as the Convention of Belém do Pará. 
The IACHR contains provisions for non-discrimination (article 1) and equality (article 
24), and specifically mentions sex as a basis for discrimination that is contrary to the 
Convention.87  Interestingly, the Convention also contains one of the earliest mentions 
of equality within marriage in multi-national human rights documents.  Article 17(4) 
reads, 
The States Parties shall take appropriate steps to ensure the equality of rights 
and the adequate balancing of responsibilities of the spouses as to marriage, 
during marriage, and in the event of its dissolution. In case of dissolution, 
provision shall be made for the necessary protection of any children solely on the 
basis of their own best interests.88 
While stereotyping is not specifically mentioned, this Article seeks to rectify inequality 
within intimate partnerships, and its reference to the adequate balancing of 
responsibilities between spouses is an implicit acknowledgement of the inequality that 
persists in gender relations.  Article 17(4) only protects married couples, however, and 
the Convention itself makes no mention of GBV.  Nevertheless, the Convention 
represents a step in the right direction. 
The OAS took a further step forward – this time perhaps better characterized as a 
further leap forward – when it drafted the Convention of Belém do Pará.  The Convention 
of Belém do Pará was the first multi-national treaty that directly and exclusively addressed 
GBV and was, until 2011, the only multi-national treaty to do so.  Not only is the 
Convention of Belém do Pará progressive in its substance, but it, unlike the Maputo 
                                                          
86 Organization of American States ‘Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: What is the IACHR?’ available: 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/what.htm, accessed 30 November 2011. 
87 American Convention on Human Rights (22 November 1969), available: 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic3.American%20Convention.htm, accessed 30 November 2011.   
88 Ibid. 
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Protocol, received widespread political support from States Parties.  The Convention of 
Belém do Pará provides that, “every woman has the right to be free from violence in 
both the public and private spheres” and that “every woman has the right to the 
recognition, enjoyment, exercise and protection of all human rights and freedoms 
embodied in regional and international human rights instruments.”89  The definition of 
VAW in the Convention of Belém do Pará is appropriately broad, and consists of 
physical, sexual and psychological violence, including violence which occurs within the 
family, the domestic unit or within any interpersonal relationship and within the 
community.90  The Convention of Belém do Pará also identifies the state and its agents 
as potential perpetrators of VAW, whether they are the direct instigators of the violence, 
or merely condone it.91 
The Convention has been applied in three significant cases recently, which are 
illustrative of the significance and scope of the treaty – Fernandez Ortega et al. v. 
Mexico and Rosendo Cantu and other v. Mexico, and Gonzalez et al. v. Mexico (the 
Cotton Fields case).  These cases, “solidify legal principles advanced for years by the 
Inter-American Commission […] over the gravity of the problems of discrimination and 
violence against women and the context of the State’s duties to act with due diligence 
toward these acts.”92 In the Cotton Fields case, the Court found that, while “not all 
human right[s] violation[s] committed against a woman [necessarily imply] a violation of 
the [Convention of Belém do Pará],”93 the victims in this case had been targeted because 
of their gender, and that their murders therefore constituted GBV.  The Court considered 
several factors in making this nuanced distinction and decision, including that the State 
had recognized before the Court both the gravity of the problem of violence against 
women and the influence of a culture of discrimination in the Ciudad Juárez, and reports 
                                                          
89 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women (adopted 9 June 1994) at 
arts. 3 and 4, available: http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/basic13.Conv%20of%20Belem%20Do%20Para.htm, accessed 11 
October 2011 [Convention of Belém do Pará]. 
90 Ibid at art. 2. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Rosa M. Celorio ‘The Rights of Women in the Inter-American System of Human Rights: Current Opportunities and Challenges in 
Standard-Setting’ (2010-2011) 65 U. Miami L. Rev. 819 at 819 [Celorio]. 
93 As quoted in Celorio, ibid at 841.   
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from international bodies and NGOs indicating that many of these murders were 
manifestations of gender-based violence.94  Moreover, the Court found a violation under 
article 1(1) of the Convention of Belém do Pará, which stipulates a general obligation 
not to discriminate.   
 
Lastly, the Convention of Belém do Pará contains provisions which directly address 
stereotyping.  Article 8(b) contains a specific obligation for States to, 
undertake progressively specific measures, including programs […] to modify 
social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, including the 
development of formal and informal educational programs appropriate to every 
level of the educational process, to counteract prejudices, customs and all other 
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or superiority of either of 
the sexes or on the stereotyped roles for men and women which legitimize or 
exacerbate violence against women. […]95 
In the Inter-American system, as in the African system, education seems to be the focus 
of measures to eradicate GBV by addressing gender stereotypes based on a power 
imbalance.   Let us now examine another well-established regional normative 
framework, the European system.   
iii. EUROPE  
The European regional system is well-established and progressive in its handling of the 
issue of GBV.  The system can be subcategorized into two branches: the European 
Union (EU) and the Council of Europe (CoE), and their respective adjudicatory arms, 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR).  This creates a rather complex structure, with many different human rights 
instruments, as well large degree of latitude in terms of scope and substance.  As 
Samantha Besson writes, “the sheer multiplicity of sources, scopes and contents of the 
guarantees of the non-discrimination principle in Europe is bewildering.”96  The Charter 
of Fundamental Rights from the EU system is older than the CoE instruments, and 
                                                          
94 Ibid at footnote 138. 
95Convention of Belém do Pará, supra note 89. 
96 Samantha Besson ‘Gender Discrimination under EU and ECHR Law’ (2008) 8 HRLR 647 at 681.  
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contains broader provisions in regards to women’s human rights.  Namely, the Charter 
contains a chapter dedicated to equality, which contains both the principle of non-
discrimination (article 21) and the principle of equality between men and women (article 
23).97 While explicit mention is not made of GBV, it could certainly be read into these 
provisions within the sphere of discrimination.  The European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), which is under the ambit of the CoE, entered into force in 1950, and, 
like the Charter of Fundamental Rights, does not provide any specific protections for 
women in regards to GBV.  It does, however, contain a non-discrimination clause that 
enumerates sex as a basis for discrimination.98  
The Council recently developed the Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence 
against Women and Domestic Violence, which was opened to signatures on 11 May 
2011.99  The Convention applies in times of peace, as well as during armed conflict 
(article 2), and defines VAW as, “a violation of human rights and a form of discrimination 
against women and shall mean all acts of gender-based violence that result in, or are 
likely to result in, physical, sexual, psychological or economic harm or suffering to 
women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, 
whether occurring in public or in private life.”100  The treaty defines GBV as, “violence 
that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women 
disproportionately,”101 which echoes the interpretation that the Inter-American Court 
gave in the Cotton Fields decision. 
This Convention is particularly interesting in that it obliges States Parties to promote 
changes in the social and cultural patterns of behaviour of women and men in order to 
eradicate prejudices, customs and traditions based on stereotyped roles and the notion 
                                                          
97 Charter of Fundamental Freedoms of the European Union (18 December 2000), available: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf, accessed 17 October 2011.   
98 European Convention on Human Rights (4 November 1950) at art. 14, available: http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html, accessed 
17 October 2011.   
99 Seventeen countries have signed the treaty as of the end of 2011, but none have ratified. 
100 Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (11 May 2011) at art. 3(b), available: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Summaries/Html/210.htm, accessed 8 December 2011. 
101 Ibid at art. 3(d).   
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of women being inferior to men.102  It is not clear how this is to be achieved, but it is an 
unambiguous admission that stereotyping must be addressed urgently in order for the 
fight to eradicate GBV to be successful.  While the Convention represents an important 
step forward for members of the CoE in terms of the eradication of GBV, the practical 
significance of the Convention is difficult to determine since the instrument has not yet 
has entered into force.   
iv. ASIA  
The Asian region has often been cited as lagging behind the rest of the world in terms of 
human rights frameworks, and did not, until recently, have any sort of regional 
mechanism that dealt specifically with human rights.  One commentator suggested that 
this is because,  
Asia is a conglomeration of countries with radically different social structures, and 
diverse religious, philosophical, and cultural traditions; their political ideologies, 
legal systems, and degrees of economic development vary greatly; and, above 
all, there is no shared historical past even from the times of colonialism.  Most 
research on human rights problems in Asia has, therefore, been national rather 
than regional.103 
While Asia is certainly a very diverse continent with a variety of cultures, religions, and 
historical narratives, this can also be said for other regions which do have a regional 
system for the protection and promotion for human rights.   
In 2007, a sub-regional organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN)104 drafted the ASEAN Charter, which established a human rights body.105  The 
ASEAN Charter’s provisions are, however, fairly broad, vague, and do not directly tackle 
the issue of GBV.  An NGO that represents a variety of civil society organizations in the 
region has stated that, “the ASEAN Charter does not specifically address the human 
                                                          
102 Ibid at arts. 12(1) and 12(2).   
103 Weston et al., supra note 70 at 586-587, footnote 2.   
104 The Member States of ASEAN: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam.   
105 ASEAN Charter (December 2007) at art. 14, available: http://www.kemlu.go.id/Documents/ASEAN-Charter.pdf, accessed 13 
October 2011 [ASEAN Charter]. 
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rights of women, children or other marginalized communities.”106  The Charter provides 
that ASEAN should, “promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms” 
(article 1), and act in accordance with “respect for fundamental freedoms, in the 
promotion and protection of human rights [as well as] upholding the United Nations 
Charter and International law.”107 The human rights body which the Charter established 
has also been met with some concern from women’s groups.  The Women’s Caucus 
also noted with concern that the ASEAN Human Rights Body does not specify women’s 
participation in the body.  The Caucus asserted that, “[i]t is clear that the basic principle 
of gender equality, provisions to ensure gender parity in the members of the [Human 
Rights Body], and women in decision-making positions in the Secretariat, which will 
support the work of the said body, are not expressly addressed in the [terms of 
reference].”108   
The paucity of the ASEAN Charter in regards to women’s human rights was indirectly 
recognized with the drafting of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against 
Women in the ASEAN Region, which acknowledges that more needs to be done in 
order to move towards the elimination of VAW in the region.  The Declaration, which is 
not binding, does nevertheless recognize that, “violence against women both violates 
and impairs their human rights and fundamental freedoms, limits their access to and 
control of resources and activities, and impedes the full development of their 
potential.”109  The eight-point Declaration does not, however, make a substantial effort 
to progressively assist in the protection and promotion of women’s human rights.  The 
provisions are broad – for example, clause 5 states that “all necessary measures” must 
be taken to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women, but does not expand on 
any examples of what those measures might entail.  Furthermore, no mention is made 
of stereotyping as a root cause of the discrimination women face and that can, in turn, 
                                                          
106 Women’s Caucus for the ASEAN Human Rights Body, as quoted by Veronica Uy ‘Women’s Group Says ASEAN Charter not pro-
women, pro-kids’ (3 April 2009) Inquirer.net, available: http://globalnation.inquirer.net/news/news/view/20090304-192280/ASEAN-
charter-not-pro-women-pro-kids, accessed 9 December 2011 [Women’s Caucus]. 
107 ASEAN Charter, supra note 105 at art. 1.   
108 Women’s Caucus, supra note 106. 
109 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women in the ASEAN Region (13 June 2004), available: 
http://www.asean.org/16189.htm, accessed 9 December 2011.   
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manifest itself as GBV.  Few commentators have paid any attention to the Declaration, 
which is reflective of its weakness.   
The ASEAN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women did, however, 
provide for “the establishment of an ASEAN commission on the promotion and 
protection of the rights of women and children.”110  In April 2010, the ASEAN 
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children 
(ACWC) was inaugurated in accordance with the Declaration, with VAW being one of 
the thematic areas of concern for the Commission.111  While still it its embryonic stages 
– the First and Second Meetings of the ACWC were held in February 2011 and June 
2011, respectively – the Commission offers a glimmer of hope for the advancement of 
women’s human rights in the South East Asia region.  The terms of reference of the 
ACWC are slightly problematic, however.112  There are no provisions for gender parity 
on the Commission or for women’s involvement in general in the decision-making 
processes, which mirrors the concerns voiced over the ASEAN Human Rights Body. A 
definitive assessment of how the ACWC will function in practice is, however, premature.  
Moreover, the drafting of a declaration that precisely deals with VAW, and the 
establishment of a specialized Commission, is indicative of at least a modicum of 
political will on the issue, and perhaps it will lay the foundation for more substantive and 
binding instruments to be created in the future, as well as increased oversight on the 
issue of GBV in South East Asia. 
v. THE MIDDLE EAST 
The Middle East is an anomaly in terms of regional human rights structures.  It does not 
have a regional human rights instrument per se, but the Arab States in the Middle East 
region have drafted a Charter on human rights.  Approximately half of the Member 
                                                          
110 As quoted by Amnesty International ‘The ASEAN Charter and Human Rights: A Window of Opportunity or Window Dressing?’ 
(July 2008), available: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA03/003/2008/en/384b86ba-4393-11dd-a1d1-
2fa8cc41ebbd/asa030032008eng.pdf, accessed 23 November 2011. 
111 ASEAN ‘First Press Release of the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children 
(ACWC)’ (16 June 2011), available: http://www.aseansec.org/26409.htm, accessed 9 December 2011. 
112 ASEAN ‘Terms of Reference of the ASEAN Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children 
(ACWC)’ (2010), available: http://www.asean.org/documents/TOR-ACWC.pdf, accessed 9 December 2011.   
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States of the League of Arab States, which drafted the Arab Charter on Human Rights, 
are actually located in Africa, however, and it is unclear how those states which are 
members of both the African Union and the League of Arab States will implement 
different sets of human rights obligations.   It could therefore be argued that the Charter 
is more of an ethnic instrument, rather than a regional one, but with the large population 
it contains, it nevertheless merits an examination in the context of this dissertation on 
the basis of its multi-national character.  
The Arab Charter on Human Rights113 entered into force in 2008, and with it, a treaty 
body was established to supervise its implementation, the Arab Human Rights 
Committee.114  Article 33(2) of the Arab Charter does prohibit “all forms of violence or 
abuse in the [family relations], and particularly against women and children,”115 and 
provides that, “men and women are equal in respect of human dignity, rights and 
obligations within the framework of positive discrimination established in favour of women 
by the Islamic Shariah, other divine laws and by applicable laws and legal instruments.” 
No mention is made of stereotypes, however, and the tone of the Charter is patronizing 
towards women in the sense that women are classified along with children, the mentally 
disabled, and the elderly, as needing special protection measures.116   
The ability of the Arab Human Rights Committee to effectively oversee the 
implementation of the Arab Charter has been called into question, however, as have the 
substantive provisions of the Charter itself.  The Committee has not released any public 
documents recording its outcomes since its first session in April 2009, for example.117  
Moreover, while the Committee is comprised of seven independent experts elected by 
secret ballot, “a number, if not all, of the current Committee members hold government 
                                                          
113 Arab Charter on Human Rights (15 March 2008), available: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/loas2005.html, accessed 7 
December 2011 [Arab Charter]. 
114 Mervat Rishmawi ‘The Arab Charter on Human Rights and the League of Arab States: An Update’ (2010) 10:1 Human Rights 
Law Review 169 at 170 [Rishmawi]. 
115 Arab Charter, supra note 113.   
116 Ibid at art. 33.   
117 Rishmawi, supra note 114 at 172. 
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positions.”118  There are also no provisions for individual or State complaints, so the 
Committee is mainly a monitoring body.119  The transparency and independence of the 
Committee is therefore rather questionable, and without public records of its proceedings, 
it is difficult to hold its members accountable.   
In terms of the substance of the Charter, there are several concerns that have been 
raised.  Firstly, the Charter refers to Zionism as “an impediment to human dignity and a 
major barrier to the exercise of the fundamental rights of all peoples.”120  Article 8 of the 
Charter prohibits torture or cruel, degrading, humiliating or inhuman treatment, but omits a 
prohibition regarding punishment.121  The Charter contains a few socio-economic rights, 
such as the rights to work, to free basic health care, and the right to free education at the 
primary level, but these only apply to citizens of the States’ Parties, not to all people within 
the jurisdiction of the State.122  It remains to be seen how the Charter and the 
Commission will contribute to the protection and promotion of human rights in the Arab 
world.    
vi. OTHER COUNTRIES 
An examination of regional frameworks for the protection of women’s human rights 
would not be complete without mentioning those nations that are not a Party to any 
regional instruments.  As we have seen, regional treaty bodies provide an invaluable 
locus for the protection, promotion and adjudication of human rights.  Nevertheless, 
many countries have opted not to become States Parties to the regional instruments 
available to them, while some regions do not have a system to begin with.  Examples of 
the former – countries who have not signed onto regional instruments that do exist – 
include Canada and the United States, who, while members of OAS, have neither 
                                                          
118 Ibid at 173. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Arab Charter, supra note 113 at art. 2.   
121 Ibid at art. 8.  
122Rishmawi, supra note 114 at 171.   
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signed nor ratified the Convention of Belém do Pará.123  Asia is a glaring example of the 
lack of a regional human rights treaty system – ASEAN remains a sub-regional group, 
and does not include states such as India, China or Japan.   
While states in these regions do have the option to be part of international instruments, 
namely CEDAW, the absence of a regional system, particularly one with adjudicatory 
functions, leaves the citizens of those countries at a disadvantage.   Not having a regional 
human rights treaty system means that local and regional issues are not necessarily 
represented at the international level, and the barriers to access for complainants are 
multiplied.124  In the case of countries that do have regional normative frameworks at their 
disposal that deal specifically and solely with the issue of GBV, and who have simply 
refused to sign these important documents, it is reflective of the lack of political will 
surrounding the issue of GBV.   The following chapter will provide an overview of the 
international normative framework surrounding women’s human rights, specifically in 
regards to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women and its Committee.   
  
VII. INTERNATIONAL NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK 
The international human rights movement against violence to women 
provides a valuable site for understanding how new categories of meaning 
emerge and are applied to social practices around the world.  
– Sally Engle Merry, 2007125 
In order to properly address the various protections offered at the international level, I 
will examine the international normative framework in two parts, beginning with the 
provisions relating to GBV, and then moving onto a consideration of how stereotyping 
has been dealt with by relevant treaty bodies.   
 
                                                          
123 Organization of American States ‘Signatories and Ratification: Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and 
Eradication of Violence against Women’ (2011), available: 
http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic14.Conv%20of%20Belem%20Do%20Para%20Ratif.htm, accessed 7 December 2011.   
124 Weston et al., supra note 70 at 615.   
125 Sally Engle Merry Human Rights & Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local Justice (2007) at 1.   
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i. International Law and Gender-based Violence 
At an international level, the scope and significance of instruments which can be 
interpreted to incorporate protections against GBV depends on how we interpret the 
causes, consequences and context of GBV.  CEDAW, the only legally binding 
international human rights instrument dedicated to women, does not contain any explicit 
references to VAW.  Instead, we rely on its first article, which provides that, 
"discrimination against women" shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction 
made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying 
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, 
on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.126 
As such, in order to rely on CEDAW in regards to VAW, we must see GBV as an act of 
discrimination.  In CEDAW’s General Recommendation 19 on violence against women, 
the Committee makes this link explicit: “[g]ender-based violence is a form of 
discrimination that seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a 
basis of equality with men.”127 Moreover, General Recommendation 19 states that, “full 
implementation of the Convention required states to take positive measures to eliminate 
all forms of violence against women.”128 
By placing GBV correctly and explic tly within the context of discrimination, CEDAW 
unambiguously links GBV and discrimination, and thus broadens the number of binding 
international instruments which can be interpreted to incorporate provisions on the 
eradication of GBV - article 1 of the UN Charter, for instance, provides that one of the 
four principal purposes of the UN is to be achieved by, “promoting and encouraging 
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language, or religion.”129  The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the 
                                                          
126 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted 18 December 1979, entry into force 3 
September 1981), available: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm#part1, accessed 11 November 2011 
[CEDAW Convention]. 
127 CEDAW GR 19, supra note 27.   
128 Ibid at ¶4.   
129 UN Charter, supra note 69.     
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Convention on the Rights of the Child are all binding international instruments which 
contain non-discrimination and equality clauses.  Moreover, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which some argue has reached customary international law status and 
is therefore also binding, protects the rights and freedoms of all, irrespective of sex.130 
In regards to policy, the Beijing Declaration and the Declaration on the Elimination of 
Violence against Women (DEVAW) provide another layer of international guiding 
principles in regards to GBV.  The Beijing Declaration reaffirms States’ determination to, 
“prevent and eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls” 131 and contains 
an entire section dedicated to VAW.  The strategic objectives developed in Beijing 
include steps to integrate measures to prevent and eliminate violence against women, 
to study the causes and consequences of VAW and the effectiveness of preventative 
measures, and to eliminate trafficking in women and assist victims of violence due to 
prostitution and trafficking.132  DEVAW, as its name suggests, deals explicitly and 
extensively with the issue at hand.133  Eradication of violence against women is the 
objective of this Declaration, and the role States must play is crucial in this endeavour – 
this is an important development, because it shatters the notion that violence against 
women, particularly in times of so-called peace, is beyond the reach of the State and 
should be considered a private matter.   
Another relevant international instrument is the Convention against Torture, and other 
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).134  Although CAT does 
not specifically equate GBV with torture, GBV could conceivably fall under CAT’s 
definition of torture in article 1(1).135  In Ali v. Reno,136 for example, a US Court found 
                                                          
130 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) at art. 2, available: http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a2, 
accessed 11 November 2011.   
131 United Nations ‘Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women – Beijing, 4-15 September 1995’, available: 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf/Beijing%20full%20report%20E.pdf, accessed 11 November 2011 [Beijing 
Declaration]. 
132 Ibid at pp. 48-55. 
133 DEVAW, supra note 32. 
134 Convention against Torture, and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted 10 December 1984, 
entry into force 26 June 1987), available: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cat.htm, accessed 12 November 2011. 
135 Ibid at art. 1(1): “For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a 
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that, “[in] a situation in which the authorities ignore or consent to severe domestic 
violence, the [CAT] appears to compel protection for a victim.”137  Moreover, article 3 of 
CAT, which states that risk of torture is grounds for non-refoulement, has been 
interpreted by domestic jurisdictions as providing a basis for not returning a woman to 
her country of origin if she is at grave risk of enduring GBV were she to return. 
ii. Provisions Relating to Stereotyping at the International Level 
The introduction to CEDAW, provided by the CEDAW Committee, contains explicit 
reference to the centrality of gender stereotypes to the discrimination experienced by 
women.  While it does not expressly link GBV and stereotyping, the causal connection 
between women’s enjoyment of human rights (or lack thereof) and stereotypes is made 
clearly evident, and the need to address entrenched misperceptions of women is 
highlighted:   
The third general thrust of the Convention aims at enlarging our understanding of the 
concept of human rights, as it gives formal recognition to the influence of culture and 
tradition on restricting women's enjoyment of their fundamental rights. These forces 
take shape in stereotypes, customs and norms which give rise to the multitude of 
legal, political and economic constraints on the advancement of women. Noting this 
interrelationship, the preamble of the Convention stresses "that a change in the 
traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family is 
needed to achieve full equality of men and women". States parties are therefore 
obliged to work towards the modification of social and cultural patterns of individual 
conduct in order to eliminate "prejudices and customary and all other practices which 
are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on 
stereotyped roles for men and women" (article 5). And Article 10 (c) mandates the 
revision of textbooks, school programmes and teaching methods with a view to 
eliminating stereotyped concepts in the field of education. Finally, cultural patterns 
which define the public realm as a man's world and the domestic sphere as women's 
domain are strongly targeted in all of the Convention's provisions that affirm the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at 
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not 
include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.” 
136
Ali v. Reno 2001 FED App. 0010P (6th Cir.), available: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,USA_CA_6,,IRQ,,4152e0f418,0.html, accessed 14 October 2011 [Ali v. Reno]. 
137
Ibid. 
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equal responsibilities of both sexes in family life and their equal rights with regard to 
education and employment. Altogether, the Convention provides a comprehensive 
framework for challenging the various forces that have created and sustained 
discrimination based upon sex.138 
While this text is not binding, it is indicative of the intention of the drafters of CEDAW, as 
well as how the CEDAW Committee believes the Convention should be interpreted. 
In regards to binding provisions, CEDAW contains two articles which specifically 
address stereotyping.  Article 5 of CEDAW provides that,  
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures: 
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, 
with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all 
other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority 
of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women; […]139 
Article 10(c), furthermore, provides that,  
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in order to ensure to them equal rights with men in the field of 
education and in particular to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: 
[…] 
(c) The elimination of any stereotyped concept of the roles of men and 
women at all levels and in all forms of education by encouraging coeducation 
and other types of educat on which will help to achieve this aim and, in 
particular, by the revision of textbooks and school programmes and the 
adaptation of teaching methods; […]140 
These are important clauses that recognize stereotyping as an underlying cause 
discrimination against women, as well as stereotyping’s role in perpetuating the denial 
of women’s equal enjoyment of their rights.  Again, there is no specific connection made 
between GBV and stereotypes but, as we have seen earlier, if we conceptualize GBV 
as a visible form of discrimination, then the link becomes clearer.  It is important to note 
that States Parties to CEDAW are legally bound to proactively modify the stereotyped 
                                                          
138 Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women ‘Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women: Introduction’ (18 December 1979), available: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cedaw.htm.    
139 CEDAW Convention, supra note 126. 
140 CEDAW Convention, supra note 126. 
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roles of men and women, although no specific examples or recommendations of how to 
do this it provided.   
The Beijing Declaration contains a comprehensive acknowledgement of the significance 
of stereotyping to subsequent discrimination.  The Declaration notes with concern that 
“global communication networks have been used to spread stereotyped and demeaning 
images of women for narrow commercial and consumerist purposes,”141 and urges 
governments to,  
encourage the media to examine the impact of gender role stereotypes, including 
those perpetuated by commercial advertisements which foster gender-based 
violence and inequalities, and how they are transmitted during the life cycle, and 
take measures to eliminate these negative images with a view to promoting a 
violence-free society.142 
This is a clear recognition that gender stereotypes, particularly those perpetuated by the 
media, share an important causal link with GBV and the effectiveness of preventative 
measures. 
 
The Beijing Declaration also contains policy recommendations when it comes to 
education and health, and their relationship to stereotyping.  In regards to education, the 
drafters of the Declaration suggested that governments, the private sector, NGOs, the 
UN, and trade unions, “design and provide educational programmes through innovative 
media campaigns and school and community education programmes to raise 
awareness on gender equality and non-stereotyped gender roles of women and men 
within the family.”143  This also would include “curricula, textbooks and teaching aids 
free from gender-based stereotypes for all levels of education.”144  In regards to 
women’s health, the Beijing Declaration asserts that,  
[h]ealth policies and programmes often perpetuate gender stereotypes and fail to 
consider socio-economic disparities and other differences among women and 
may not fully take account of the lack of autonomy of women regarding their 
                                                          
141 Beijing Declaration, supra note 131 at ¶33. 
142 Ibid at ¶129(d). 
143 Ibid at ¶180(b). 
144 Ibid at ¶83(a). 
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health. Women’s health is also affected by gender bias in the health system and 
by the provision of inadequate and inappropriate medical services to women.145 
By targeting two pillars of society – education and health – the Beijing Declaration seeks 
to prevent the attitudes and biases which make GBV permissible and which perpetuate 
its existence. 
The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (DEVAW) places equal 
emphasis on the role of education in addressing the stereotyped roles of men and 
women in regards to combating VAW.  Article 4(j) reads,  
States should pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of 
eliminating violence against women and, to this end, should:  […] 
(j) Adopt all appropriate measures, especially in the field of education, to 
modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women and 
to eliminate prejudices, customary practices and all other practices based 
on the idea of the inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes and on 
stereotyped roles for men and women; […]146 
These non-binding, but highly persuasive, policy recommendations represent the first 
instances at the international level where the link between stereotypes and 
discrimination, including GBV, has been elaborated upon.  The practical 
recommendations – such as the educational and media initiatives – are crucial aspects 
that governments can, and should, address.  The CEDAW Committee’s role is 
instrumental in ensuring that States abide by their obligations and take into account 
relevant policy initiatives.  In the following Chapter, I will expand upon CEDAW’s role, 
taking into account its mandate, as well as critically examining the jurisprudence that is 
a product of the Committee’s work. 
 
VIII. THE CEDAW COMMITTEE, GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE AND GENDER 
STEREOTYPING  
 
Although the [periodic state reports]have come from States with different 
levels of development, they present features in varying degrees showing the 
existence of stereotyped conceptions of women, owing to socio-cultural 
                                                          
145Beijing Declaration, supra note 131 at ¶90. 
146 DEVAW, supra note 32. 
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factors, that perpetuate discrimination based on sex and hinder the 
implementation of article 5 of the Convention. 
- CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 3, 1987147 
 
Now that we have critically examined the international and regional normative 
frameworks that exist, it is important to analyse the role the CEDAW Committee plays in 
the oversight of the implementation of the Convention’s provisions at a domestic level.  
This section will begin with a consideration of the role, mandate and functions of the 
CEDAW Committee.  It will go on to examine how periodic State reports are dealt with, 
including discussion on the importance of the Concluding Observations.  This section 
will also highlight the significance of General Recommendations, as well as that of the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention.  Finally, this section will examine CEDAW’s 
jurisprudence in order to provide a comprehensive overview of the myriad of ways in 
which the CEDAW Committee plays a fundamental role in the eradication of gender 
stereotyping as an underlying cause of GBV.    
i. CEDAW Committee’s Mandate  
Before beginning with an examination of the CEDAW Committee’s role in eliminating 
gender stereotyping and GBV, it is first important to understand the purpose and 
mandate of the Committee itself.  Broadly, the purpose of the Committee is to monitor 
States Parties’ compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, and currently meets three times per year, in either 
Geneva or New York.148  The mandate of the Committee is thus based on oversight, 
rather than on enforcement.  As one commentator remarked, 
ratification of CEDAW, with the prime obligation of reporting, makes states 
accountable by international standards and subjects them to international scrutiny.  
This makes the CEDAW Convention and its reporting process a potent tool not only 
in the international arena but also in the domestic struggle for the advancement of 
women.   The reporting process provides the opportunity to assess the conformity of 
domestic guarantees for equal rights for women with the international framework, to 
                                                          
147 Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women ‘General Recommendation 3 – Education and public 
information programmes’ (3rd Session, 1987), as quoted in Cook and Cusack, supra note 46 at 134.    
148 Cook and Cusack, supra note 46 at 131. 
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develop baseline data concerning the factual position of women, and to identify 
obstacles to the implementation of CEDAW.149 
The Committee reviews periodic reports submitted by the States Parties, and considers 
them in light of the so-called shadow reports of other stakeholders (namely relevant UN 
bodies and NGOs).  The Committee then prepares a list of issues and questions on 
specific topics that were raised during a pre-sessional working group, which the State 
Party may respond to in advance of appearing before the Committee.  The State 
Reports contain information on what the country has done in order to eliminate 
discrimination against women, as well as any factors which may have impeded 
implementation of the Convention.150 The Committee then engages in a constructive 
dialogue with States Parties about their reports, which involves Committee members 
posing a series of questions to representatives on the State in question, who then have 
an opportunity to respond.151  Finally, the Committee drafts concluding observations, 
which provide an “expert assessment of a State Party’s compliance with the 
Convention, but also [elaborates on] the nature and scope of States Parties’ normative 
obligations to elimination all forms of discrimination against women.”152  All of the above 
information is made public, and is published in the five official languages of the CEDAW 
Committee – English, French, Spanish, Arabic, Chinese and Russian – so as to make 
the information accessible to all States Parties, as well as to the general population.     
Now that we have briefly discussed the CEDAW Committee’s mandate, let us proceed 
to a closer examination of the various functions of the Committee, from the State 
Reports to the Concluding Observations to the General Recommendations, before 
turning our attention to the quasi-judicial function of the Committee established in its 
Optional Protocol.   
 
                                                          
149 Ruth Halperin-Kaddari Women in Israel: A State of Their Own (2004) at 5-6.   
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid at 132.  
152 Ibid.  
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ii. Consideration of State Party Reports and Concluding Observations 
The CEDAW Committee uses its Concluding Observations to provide a final response 
and list of specific recommendations to the State Party’s periodic report, and frequently 
include references to the need for increased effort in eradicating gender stereotyping.  
In its Concluding Observations following the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s 
report in 2005, for example, the Committee noted its concern regarding, 
the persistence of traditional and stereotyped assumptions and attitudes in 
respect of the roles and responsibilities of women and men, which are 
discriminatory against women and have a pronounced impact, particularly in the 
areas of education and employment as well as in other areas of their lives. For 
example, the Committee is concerned at the stereotyping of women, which 
perceives them exclusively as caregivers and homemakers and assigns them to 
areas such as education and employment on the basis of spheres suitable to 
their “characteristics”. The Committee is concerned that such expectations of 
women have serious consequences, preventing them from accessing rights and 
entitlements on an equal basis with men and creating a dependency on men, 
husbands and family for housing, food entitlements and other services. It is also 
concerned that in times of economic crisis, as in the current situation of the 
country, women’s prescribed roles and lesser entitlement intensifies their 
hardship and amounts to multiple discrimination.153 
While not binding, statements such as these offer the State in question, as well as other 
states, a direct analysis of the problems surrounding gender stereotyping and the 
effects these have on the universal realization of human rights.  This can provide the 
basis for legislative changes, as well as new policy directions, which is why the CEDAW 
Committee’s mandate and purpose are so crucial to the advancement of women’s 
human rights.   
Perhaps the optimal way to demonstrate how the CEDAW Committee’s mandate 
functions, and what their approach to gender stereotyping in its Concluding 
Observations has been, is to examine a States Party as a case study.  South Africa has 
appeared before the CEDAW Committee on two occasions – during the 19th Session in 
June-July 1998 and, more recently, during the 48th Session in January-February 2011.  
                                                          
153 Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women ‘Concluding Observations – the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, 33
rd Session’ (22 July 2005) at ¶35, available: http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/450/18/PDF/N0545018.pdf?OpenElementm, accessed 12 December 2011.   
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In its Initial State Report, South Africa commented that patriarchy is deeply entrenched 
in the customs, cultures and religions of the country, and that children are engrained 
with the stereotypes associated with patriarchy from a young age.154 The Government 
furthermore conceded that stereotypes ascribed to women were pervasive in language, 
the education system, the media, popular culture, and everyday life.155  In response, 
South Africa changed school curriculums and established the Commission for Gender 
Equality, but asserted that there were limitations to its ability to alter stereotypes in 
regards to the media and religious groups in particular, in keeping wit3h the 
fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Constitution.156  
In its concluding observations to South Africa’s Initial State Report, the CEDAW 
Committee went right to the heart of the issue in terms of the nexus between 
stereotyping and GBV.  The Committee recommended to the South African delegation, 
that efforts to prevent and combat violence against women continue to receive the 
priority attention they require, with a view to ensuring a comprehensive approach. 
Steps should be taken, including through education, awareness-raising and 
sensitization of the public, to deal with stereotypical attitudes that are amongst the 
root causes of violence against women and to emphasize the unacceptability of such 
violence.157 
This is significant because it demonstrates the causal link the Committee views as 
existing between GBV and stereotyping.  The Committee does not directly address the 
issue of how to alter stereotypes without infringing on the constitutional fundamental 
freedoms, but recommends that education and awareness are the keys to altering 
stereotypes.  It can be gleaned that the Committee is not advocating that directives be 
ordered to religious groups or the media to change their messages, but rather that 
change must come from individuals themselves, through the catalyzing agent of the 
government spreading a message of equality and non-discrimination. 
                                                          
154 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ‘South Africa: First State Report’ (28 February 1998) at p. 44, 
available: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/CEDAW.C.ZAF.1_fr.pdf, accessed 11 December 2011. 
155 Ibid.   
156 Ibid at pp. 44-45.  
157 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ‘Concluding Observations: South Africa, 19th Session’ (29 June 
1998) at ¶122, available: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/South%20AfricaCO19_en.pdf, accessed 11 December 
2011.   
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The Committee prepared a list of issues and questions158 for South Africa in anticipation 
of South Africa’s presentation of its combined second, third and fourth periodic 
reports159 in February 2011. In its list of issues, the CEDAW Committee asked South 
Africa for additional information on a Constitutional Court judgement that, in their view, 
entrenched the role of women as caregivers and men as bread-winners.  The 
Constitutional Court case to which the CEDAW Committee referred is President of 
South Africa and Another v Hugo,160 which dealt with the release of non-violent female 
prisoners with children under the age of twelve, but refused the release of male 
prisoners under the same circumstances, following a pardon by President Nelson 
Mandela.161 The Government conceded that this reinforced the “stereotypical attitude of 
women’s roles as primary care-givers,”162 but deemed it to be a “fair discrimination” 
practice nevertheless.163  The Government also emphasized that women’s groups had 
not vociferously demanded a reversal of the decision.164  In Justice Krigler’s dissenting 
opinion, however, he pointed out that,  
the purpose of the pardon was prescriptive in nature; in remitting the sentences 
of mothers, and not fathers, President Mandela was not only saying that women 
are primary caregivers in South African society; he was also saying that women, 
and not men, should be primary caregivers.  Sex roles were imposed on men 
and women, not by virtue of their individual characteristics, qualities or choices, 
but on the basis of predetermined, albeit time-honoured, gender scripts.165 
                                                          
158 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ‘List of issues and questions with regard to the consideration of 
periodic reports – South Africa’ (2 September 2010), available: http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G10/447/65/PDF/G1044765.pdf?OpenElement, accessed 11 December 2011.   
159 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ‘South Africa: Combined Second, Third and Fourth State Report’ 
(24 March 2010), available: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/288/63/PDF/N1028863.pdf?OpenElement, 
accessed 11 December 2011. 
160 President of South Africa and Another v. Hugo 1997 s(4) SA 1 (CC); 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC). 
161 Ibid at ¶2. 
162 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ‘Responses to the list of issues and questions with regard to the 
consideration of the combined second, third and fourth periodic report’ (December 2010), at p. 17, available: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/AdvanceVersions/CEDAW.C.ZAF.Q4.Add1.pdf, accessed 11 December 2011.   
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Cook and Cusack, supra note 46 at 115. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
48 
 
 
 
The issue in this case was not so much whether or not the presidential pardon was 
based on gender stereotypes – both sides of the case conceded this point – but rather 
whether such an entrenchment of stereotyping was justifiable on other grounds.  The 
CEDAW Committee did not directly address this issue in its concluding observations, 
however.   
With the exception of not addressing South Africa’s response regarding the Hugo 
decision, the CEDAW Committee was generally more pointed in its Concluding 
Observations to South Africa in 2011 than it was following the Initial Report.  In order to 
address “the persistence of patriarchal attitudes and deep-rooted stereotypes 
concerning women’s roles and responsibilities,”166 the Committee urged South Africa, 
inter alia, to “raise awareness on the subject [of harmful practices and stereotypes that 
discriminate against women,] targeting men and women at all levels of society, including 
traditional leaders, in collaboration with civil society.”167 The Committee also expressed 
concern with the “continuing stereotypical portrayal of women in the media, which 
encourages discrimination and undermines the equality of women and men.”168  This 
approach can be distinguished from the more vague suggestions the Committee gave in 
response to South Africa’s Initial State Report in 1998; here, in 2011, the CEDAW 
Committee expressly mentions that portrayals of women in the media need to be 
addressed urgently, and that a variety of different leaders and members of society must 
be involved in the effort to eradicate GBV through altering discriminatory stereotypes.   
iii. General Recommendations 
The Committee also issues General Recommendations which interpret the nature and 
scope of the obligations contained in the Convention.  Of particular relevance to the 
issue of gender stereotyping are General Recommendations 19 (violence against 
                                                          
166 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ‘Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women – South Africa’ (5 April 2011), at ¶ 20, available: http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/418/78/PDF/G1141878.pdf?OpenElement, accessed 11 December 2011.   
167 Ibid at ¶21(a).  
168 Ibid at ¶ 20.   
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women),169 21 (marriage and family relations),170 23 (political and public life),171 24 
(women and health),172 25 (temporary special measures),173 and 26 (women migrant 
workers).174  In General Recommendation No. 23, for example, the Committee 
explained how women have typically been confined to the private sphere, with 
responsibilities to be the primary caregivers and homemakers, whereas men have been 
allowed to dominate the respected spheres of political and public life.175  The Committee 
has recommended that States Parties adopt measures aimed at alleviating women’s 
domestic burden and economic dependency on men as a means of addressing this.176  
The absence of female prominence in the public realm is a clear example of how well-
entrenched stereotypes have led to the exclusion of women from political and public life, 
a clear form of gender-based discrimination.   
General Recommendation No. 25 (2004) is also central to the Committee’s role in 
eliminating gender stereotypes that perpetuate discrimination, including violent 
discrimination.  Here, the CEDAW Committee enumerated three general obligations that 
were fundamental to States Parties’ implementation of the Convention and subsequent 
elimination of all forms of discrimination against women.  The third obligation deals 
specifically with gender stereotyping, and emphasizes the centrality of eliminating 
                                                          
169 CEDAW GR 19, supra note 27.    
170 Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women ‘General Recommendation 21 – Equality in marriage 
and family relations’ (13
th Session, 1994), available: 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#recom21, accessed 12 December 2011.    
171 Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women ‘General Recommendation 23 – women in political 
and public life’ (16
th Session, 1997), available: 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#recom23, accessed 12 December 2011.    
172 Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women ‘General Recommendation 24 – Women and health’ 
(20th Session, 1999), available: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#recom24, accessed 12 
December 2011.    
173 Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women ‘General Recommendation 25 – Temporary special 
measures’ (30
th Session, 2004), available: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#recom25, 
accessed 12 December 2011.    
174 Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women ‘General Recommendation 26 – Women Migrant 
Workers’ (42
nd Session, 2008), available: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#recom26, 
accessed 12 December 2011.    
175 Cook and Cusack, supra note 46 at 134.  
176 CEDAW GR 23, supra note 171 at ¶11. 
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stereotypes in States’ efforts to combat discrimination: “States parties’ obligation is to 
address prevailing gender relations
 
and the persistence of gender-based stereotypes 
that affect women not only through individual acts by individuals but also in law, and 
legal and societal structures and institutions.”177 
General Recommendation No. 19 (1992) is particularly relevant when considering the 
relationship between GBV and gender stereotyping, because its thematic focus is 
violence against women.  Here, the CEDAW Committee unequivocally states, 
Traditional attitudes by which women are regarded as subordinate to men or as 
having stereotyped roles perpetuate widespread practices involving violence or 
coercion, such as family violence and abuse, forced marriage, dowry deaths, acid 
attacks and female circumcision. Such prejudices and practices may justify gender-
based violence as a form of protection or control of women. The effect of such 
violence on the physical and mental integrity of women is to deprive them the equal 
enjoyment, exercise and knowledge of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
While this comment addresses mainly actual or threatened violence the underlying 
consequences of these forms of gender-based violence help to maintain women in 
subordinate roles and contribute to the low level of political participation and to their 
lower level of education, skills and work opportunities.178 
Similar to the Committee’s Concluding Observations, General Recommendations are 
not binding.  Nevertheless, they provide an indispensable persuasive basis for policy 
and legislative change, as well as an important advocacy tool for NGOs lobbying 
governments.179  Another tool that the CEDAW Committee has developed is the 
Convention’s Optional Protocol, which provides the basis for a complaints mechanism 
to the Committee and has resulted in important jurisprudential outputs.   
iv. CEDAW’s Optional Protocol – Complaints Mechanism 
In 1999, the Committee drafted an Optional Protocol to the CEDAW Convention which 
established a complaints mechanism.180   The Optional Protocol entered into force on 
                                                          
177 CEDAW GR 25, supra note 173 at ¶7.   
178 CEDAW GR 19, supra note 27 at ¶11.   
179 International Land Coalition ‘How to Use CEDAW as an Advocacy Tool’ (November 2009), available: http://www.e-
quality.nl/assets/e-quality/dossiers/VNVrouwenverdrag/ILC_infonoteCEDAW.pdf, accessed 12 December 2011.   
180 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (6 October 1999), available: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cedaw-one-about.htm, accessed 12 December 2011 [OP-CEDAW] 
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22 December 2000, and currently has 103 States Parties.181  The communications 
procedures allows individuals, groups of individuals, or people acting on their behalf, to 
submit claims that they have been the victims of a violation of any of the rights in the 
CEDAW Convention.182  Admissibility is assessed on the basis of whether all available 
domestic remedies have been exhausted;183 that the same matter has not already been 
examined by the Committee or by another procedure of international investigation or 
settlement;184 that the facts alleged occurred after the Optional Protocol’s entry into 
force for the State Party;185 and that the communication is not manifestly ill-founded or 
insufficiently substantiated, and is not an abuse of the right to submit a complaint.186  
Once a case has been deemed admissible, the Committee considers the complaint 
based on its merits.  The Committee then issues a decision in the form of views, 
together with any recommendations.187  While the Optional Prot col does not have an 
enforcement mechanism per se, it does allow the Committee to follow up with States 
Parties during the reporting procedure on specific matters, as well as holding States 
accountable in a public forum. 
Several commentators have argued that the complaints mechanism, and CEDAW in 
general, provides inadequate remedies for violations of women’s human rights.  Kerri 
Ritz, for examples, notes that the Optional Protocol applies only to States that are a 
party to both CEDAW and the Optional Protocol, and that ratification of the Optional 
Protocol is subject to an ‘out-out’ clause.188 Ritz also argues that in order for the 
Optional Protocol to provide strong remedies for women and effect positive change, it 
                                                          
181 United Nations Treaty Collection ‘Status of Ratification – Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women’ available: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8-
b&chapter=4&lang=en, accessed 12 December 2011.   
182 OP-CEDAW, supra note 180.  
183 Ibid at art. 4. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Ibid.   
186 Ibid. 
187 Cook and Cusack, supra note 46 at 142-143. 
188 Kerri L. Ritz ‘Soft Enforcement: Inadequacies of Optional Protocol as a Remedy for the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women’ (2001-2002) 25:1 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 191 at 209.   
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must make the implementation of the Committee’s recommendations mandatory, and 
that the Committee should have criminal jurisdiction over the violators of women’s 
human rights.189  
Vaughn Lowe has expressed that, “if no consequences attach to [breaches of 
international law], we should question whether they are rules of law or statements of 
policy or aspiration.”190  While this is a valid point to a certain extent, I take issue with 
posing law, policy and aspiration as mutually exclusive concepts.  A consideration that 
should be addressed, however, is that gender stereotyping may impede access to the 
complaints mechanism.191  It is not clear how the Committee intends to deal with the 
fact that the very stereotypes that they are attempting to alter may be an impediment to 
complaints being brought in the first place – if a woman is illiterate as a result of the 
discrimination she faces in her country, for example, then she may not be able to submit 
a communication to the Committee in the first place.   
While there are limitations to the CEDAW Committee’s ability to enforce its findings 
under the Optional Protocol, the importance of naming and shaming in international 
relations should not be minimized.  As Cook and Cusack argue, “[t]he ability to eliminate 
a wrong is contingent on it first being ‘‘named,’’ by which is meant that a particular 
experience has been identified and publicly acknowledged as a wrong in need of legal 
and other forms of redress and subsequent prevention.”192  In addition, one of the 
greatest strengths of the Optional Protocol, irrespective of its perceived shortcomings, 
has been the production of invaluable jurisprudence on gender stereotyping and GBV.  
This jurisprudence provides, at the very least, persuasive value at the domestic level, 
and interprets the CEDAW Convention so as to provide guidance to States.  The 
following section will provide an examination of complaints considered by the 
Committee under the Optional Protocol where gender stereotyping was at the forefront 
of the communication. 
                                                          
189 Ibid at 213. 
190 Vaughn Lowe International Law (2007) at 119.   
191 Cook and Cusack, supra note 46 at 143. 
192 Cook and Cusack, supra note 46 at 39.   
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v. CEDAW Jurisprudence 
Since the establishment of a complaints mechanism, CEDAW has received many 
communications from individuals, groups of individuals, and people representing the 
alleged victims.  Many have been deemed inadmissible, so the focus of this section will 
be on cases which were considered admissible by the Committee.   Due to its 
significance in the area of gender stereotyping and GBV, I will also provide some 
analysis of CEDAW’s Ciudad Juárez inquiry,193 although it was not based on a 
complaint but was rather examined under the Committee’s inquiry procedure.   
The CEDAW Committee has heard complaints alleging article 5 violations on many 
occasions, and, in each, violence was also an issue in the case. In Fatma Yildirium v. 
Austria (2005),194 the author of the complaint was an organization acting on the behalf 
of an Austrian woman who was repeatedly harassed and physically assaulted by her 
husband, until he eventually killed her after she filed for divorce.  Ms. Yildirium made 
repeated attempts to have the police intervene, and took every judicial option at her 
disposal to remove herself from the abusive situation she was in, but the authorities 
were nevertheless unable to protect her from being murdered.  The authors of the 
complaint argued that,  
the murder of Fatma Yildirium is one tragic example of the prevailing lack of 
seriousness with which violence against women is viewed by the public and by the 
Austrian authorities.  The criminal justice system, particularly public prosecutors and 
judges, consider the issue a social or domestic problem, a minor or petty offence 
that happens in certain social classes.  They do not apply criminal law to such 
violence because they do not take the danger seriously.195  
                                                          
193 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women  ‘Report on Mexico produced by the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women under article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention, and reply from the 
Government of Mexico’ (27 January 2005), available: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw32/CEDAW-C-2005-OP.8-
MEXICO-E.pdf, accessed 14 December 2011 [Ciudad Juarez Report]. 
194 Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women ‘Communication No. 6/2005: Fatma Yildirium v. 
Austria’ (1 October 2007), available: http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005&Lang=E, 
accessed 14 December 2011. 
195 Ibid at ¶3.6. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
54 
 
 
 
This was a similar line of argument taken in the Sahide Goekce v. Austria (2005)196 
case, where the alleged victim was represented by the same organization that 
submitted Ms. Yildirium’s complaint, and where the fact scenario was virtually identical. 
In both the Goekce and Yildirium cases, the Committee recommended that the State 
Party, “vigilantly and in a speedy manner prosecute perpetrators of domestic violence in 
order to convey to offenders and the public that society condemns domestic 
violence.”197   
In the most recent decision from the CEDAW Committee, Peru was found to be in 
violation of article 5 of the Convention on the basis that,  
placing conditions on timely access to a medical treatment on which the exercise 
of the right to health, life and life of dignity depended by continuing an unwanted 
pregnancy resulted in discrimination based on the stereotype of imposing the 
reproductive function on [the complainant] above her welfare.198 
This complaint focused on a Peruvian girl who, at the age of 13, was sexually abused 
by a 34-year-old man.  The abuse resulted in a pregnancy.  Suffering from depression, 
L.C. attempted to commit suicide by jumping off a building, which resulted in her being 
paralysed from the neck down.  While in hospital for these injuries, L.C. requested an 
abortion. In Peru, however, abortion on the grounds of rape or sexual abuse is not 
legally available, and a decision regarding L.C.’s request was repeatedly delayed.  
Eventually, at 16 weeks pregnant, L.C. spontaneously miscarried.  The CEDAW 
Committee found that, “the decision to postpone the surgery due to the pregnancy was 
influenced by the stereotype that protection of the foetus should prevail over the health 
of the mother.”199  Furthermore, the Committee recommended that the State Party take 
measures that include, “education and training programmes to encourage health 
                                                          
196 Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women ‘Communication No. 5/2005: Sahide Goekce v. 
Austria’ (6 August 2007), available:  http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005&Lang=E, 
accessed 14 December 2011.   
197 Ibid at ¶12.3(b).   
198 Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women ‘Communication No. 22/2009: L.C. v. Peru’ (4 
November 2011) at ¶3.3, available: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/docs/CEDAW-C-50-D-22-2009_en.pdf, accessed 14 
December 2011.   
199 Ibid at ¶8.15.   
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providers to change their attitudes and behaviour in relation to adolescent women 
seeking reproductive health services and respond to specific health needs related to 
sexual violence.”200  This represents an important decision because it illustrates yet 
another arena in which women are stereotyped to their detriment; by recommending 
that Peru educate its health professionals in order to alter their attitudes and behavior, 
the Committee is providing a means by which States Parties can comply with article 5 of 
the Convention in the hopes of eradicating discriminatory stereotypes of women.   
The A.T. v. Hungary201 and Vertido v. Philippines202 decisions are of central importance 
to CEDAW’s jurisprudential legacy in contributing to the eradication of GBV by effecting 
compliance with article 5 of the Convention.  In A.T. v. Hungary, the Committee 
considered the case of a woman who faced repeated abuse from her common-law 
husband, resulting in 10 medical certificates being issued since 1998 in connection with 
separate incidents of severe physical violence.203  Here, the Committee made the 
express link between gender stereotyping and GBV, finding that the “persistence of 
entrenched traditional stereotypes regarding the role and responsibilities of women and 
men in the family [and the] traditional attitudes by which women are regarded as 
subordinate to men”204 contributed to experiences of GBV in Hungary.   
While A.T. v. Hungary represents an important piece of jurisprudence in the context of 
GBV and gender stereotyping, some commentators believe that the Committee did not 
go far enough.  In their recent book on gender stereotyping in international law, 
Rebecca Cook and Simone Cusack, note that “the Committee could have strengthened 
                                                          
200 Ibid at ¶12(b)(ii).   
201 Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women ‘Views of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women under article 7, paragraph 3 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women: Communication No.: 2/2003, Ms. A.T. v. Hungary’ (26 January 2005), available: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/docs/Case2_2003.pdf, accessed 14 December 2011 [A.T. v. Hungary]. 
202 Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women ‘Communication No. 18/2008, Karen Tayag Vertido 
v. Philippines’ (22 September 2010), available: http://daccess-
ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008&Lang=E, accessed 14 December 2011 [Vertido]. 
203 A.T. v. Hungary, supra note 201. 
204 Ibid at ¶9.4.   
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its analysis by naming the specific sex role stereotypes within the family.”205  Cook and 
Cusack suggest that stereotypes such as men being the head of household, the notion 
that women should be homemakers, wives and mothers, as well as men’s ‘proprietary 
interest’ in women should have been enumerated and discussed in order to bolster the 
Committee’s findings.206  The authors also advocate for the Committee to elucidate the 
contexts in which gender stereotypes in Hungary exist, such as within the family and in 
the criminal justice system.  Cook and Cusack argue that,  
since the Committee determined that gender stereotypes were both socially 
pervasive and persistent in Hungary, it could have described how stereotypes were 
integrated into social institution and meaning and how they facilitate the conditions 
for the social stratification and subordination of A.T., and Hungaria  women in 
general.207 
While the Committee could have been more specific in its findings, the significance of 
making an unambiguous link between GBV and gender stereotyping cannot minimized.   
A more recent decision from the CEDAW Committee’s complaints mechanism is the 
Vertido208 communication.  On 29 March 1996, the author of the complaint, Ms. Karen 
Tayag Vertido, was raped by the President o  the City Chamber she worked for.  Ms. 
Vertido reported the rape within 24 hours of the incident taking place, and underwent a 
medical and legal examination.  She filed a case, but her complaint was dismissed due 
to lack of probable cause.  Ms. Vertido appealed the dismissal, and the case remained 
at the trial court level from 1997 to 2005.  On 26 April 2005, the court issued its verdict – 
an acquittal.  The basis of this decision was three-fold: firstly, the Judge found that it is 
easy to make an accusation of rape, but difficult to prove it; secondly, that “in view of the 
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape, in which only two people are usually involved, the 
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution;”209 and thirdly, 
that the prosecution’s evidence must be persuasive on its own merits, not simply in 
                                                          
205 Cook and Cusack, supra note 46 at 157. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Vertido, supra note 202. 
209 As quoted in Vertido, supra note 202 at ¶2.9. 
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comparison to a weak defence. 210 Moreover, the Court seemed to use the fact that Ms. 
Vertigo was not a “timid woman who could be easily cowed” as evidence that the sex 
was consensual.211  In accordance with a Filipino Supreme Court ruling, the Court 
“concluded that should the author really have fought off the accused when she had 
regained consciousness, and when he was raping her, the accused would have been 
unable to proceed to the point of ejaculation, in particular bearing in mind that he was 
already in his sixties.”212   
A significant proportion of Ms. Vertigo’s complaint to the Committee was based on a 
violation of her rights under article 5 of the CEDAW Convention, and argued that the 
Court relied on gender-based myths and stereotypes in acquitting her rapist.213 She 
enumerated seven myths or stereotypes that the Court relied on, and that constituted a 
violation of article 5: 1) that a rape victim must try to escape at every opportunity;214 2) 
that to be raped by means of intimidation, the victim must be timid or easily cowed;215 3) 
that to conclude that a rape occurred by means of threat, there must be clear evidence 
of a direct threat (here, Ms. Vertido argued that lack of consent should be the basis of 
determining whether or not a rape occurred, rather than focusing on whether there was 
an element of force involved);216 4) that the fact that the accused and victim were more 
than acquaintances and therefore the sex was consensual;217 5) that when a rape victim 
reacts to the assault by resisting the attack and also by cowering in submission because 
of fear, it is problematic – Ms. Vertido was deemed to have consented to the intercourse 
because she did not resist the advances of the accused and “she did not escape when 
                                                          
210 Ibid. 
211 Ibid at ¶3.5.5. 
212 Ibid. 
213 Ibid at ¶3.5.  
214 Ibid at ¶3.5.1. 
215 Ibid at ¶3.5.2. 
216 Ibid at ¶3.5.3. 
217 Ibid at ¶3.5.4. 
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she appeared to have had so many opportunities to do so”;218  6) that a rape victim 
could not have resisted a sexual attack if the accused was able to proceed to 
ejaculation;219 and 7) that it is unbelievable that a man in his sixties would be capable of 
rape.220  Moreover, Ms. Vertido argued that her case was not isolated, and that there 
were many other examples of trial court decision in rape cases that discriminated 
against women and perpetuated discriminatory beliefs about rape victims.221   
The Committee agreed with Ms. Vertido that her treatment by the Filipino justice system 
constituted a violation of article 5.  The Committee found that,  
it is clear from the judgement that the assessment of the credibility of the author’s 
version of events was influenced by a number of stereotypes, the author in this 
situation not having followed what was expected from a rational and “ideal victim” 
or what the judge considered to be the rational and ideal response of a woman in 
a rape situation […].222 
 
Moreover, the Committee linked gender stereotyping to the right to a fair trial, which can 
now be applied to a variety of different issues in cases.223  The Committee also went a 
step further than it did in the A.T. v. Hungary communication, and named the various 
stereotypes that exist concerning rape victims.224  This is important because it allows 
other courts and governments to identify more precisely what needs to be changed in 
their legislation and judicial system in order to comply with their international obligations.  
As Cusack and Cook argue, “[n]aming a stereotype is necessary in much the same way 
that a medical diagnosis is required before medical treatment can be applied.”225  The 
Vertido case is also significant because it is the first communication heard by the 
CEDAW Committee where discriminatory gender stereotyping and States Parties’ 
                                                          
218 Ibid at ¶3.5.5. 
219 Ibid at ¶3.5.6. 
220 Ibid at ¶3.5.7. 
221 Ibid at ¶3.8. 
222 Ibid at ¶8.5. 
223 Simone Cusack and Alexandra S.H. Timmer ‘Gender Stereotyping in Rape Cases: The CEDAW Committee’s Decision in Vertido 
v. The Philippines’ (2011) Human Rights Law Review at 2 (advance access copy) [Cusack and Timmer]. 
224 Ibid at 7.  
225 As quoted in ibid at 9.   
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obligations to address wrongful attitudes and behaviours have been at the centre of the 
case.226  Some commentators have argued that the shortfall of the Vertido decision is 
that it did not go far enough in explaining and expanding upon ideas such as the role of 
the judiciary in perpetuating wrongful gender stereotypes, and in articulating the States 
Parties’ obligation to address systemic judicial stereotyping.227  Nevertheless, when we 
compare the Vertido decision to the A.T. decision, there is a clear progression on the 
part of the Committee, which is encouraging.   
 
The Committee also relied on its inquiry process to examine the issue of gender 
stereotyping when it reported on the incidents in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, in 2005.228  
The situation in Ciudad Juárez also resulted in a number of cases being brought to the 
Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,229 but the 
focus of this analysis will be on CEDAW’s inquiry into the matter.  Between 1993 and 
2003, up to 400 women were estimated to have been murdered in Ciudad Juárez, a 
Mexican city on the border with the United States.230  Of these 400 women, one third of 
the victims were reported to have been sexually assaulted; in addition, 4500 women 
have been reported missing in the same period.231  Many theories have been posited as 
to why these murders, disappearances and assaults have occurred – from police 
corruption to human trafficking to domestic violence – but consensus is that the ultimate 
cause of these incidents was GBV.232  One report found that, “the gender of the victim 
seems to have been a significant factor in the crime, influencing the motive, the context, 
the type of violence suffered by the woman and the way in which the authorities 
responded to it,”233 and that it is “all of the unstated, attached constructions and 
                                                          
226 Cusack and Timmer, supra note 223 at 8. 
227 Ibid at 10.   
228 Ciudad Juarez Report, supra note 193. 
229 See Cook and Cusack, supra note 46 at 165. 
230 Ibid. 
231 Ibid.   
232 Ibid. 
233 As quoted in ibid.   
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assumptions about a woman’s value, worth, and respectability that makes ‘being a 
woman’ dangerous in Juárez.”234  The Committee writes,  
within this context, a culture of impunity has taken root which facilitates and 
encourages terrible violations of human rights. Violence against women has also 
taken root, and has developed specific characteristics marked by hatred and 
misogyny.235   
The Human Rights Council further commented on the situation in Ciudad Juárez, 
saying, “the arrogant behaviour and obvious indifference shown by some state officials 
in regard to these cases leave the impression that many of the crimes were deliberately 
never investigated for the sole reason that the victims were ‘only’ young girls with no 
particular social status and who therefore were regarded as expendable.”236 
 
In its report, the Committee found Mexico in violation of articles 1-3, 5, 6 and 15 of the 
Convention, and that it had offended DEVAW as well as CEDAW General 
Recommendation 19.237  While Mexico had made some attempts at public information 
campaigns aimed at preventing GBV, the Committee found that even these “have 
focused not on promoting social responsibility, change in social and cultural patterns of 
conduct of men and women and women’s dignity, but on making potential victims 
responsible for their own protection by maintaining traditional cultural stereotypes.”238  
Despite highlighting the point that the Mexican authorities’ initiatives were misplaced 
and insufficient, the Committee did not elaborate fully on States’ obligations vis-à-vis 
article 5 of the Convention.239  Moreover, some scholars have pointed out that the 
Committee failed to name “the compound stereotype that poor, young, migrant women 
are inferior to men and other subgroups of women and, therefore, once their value has 
been used up, they can be discarded like waste.”240  While the report may not have 
                                                          
234 Ibid.  
235 Ciudad Juarez Report, supra note 193, at ¶26.   
236 As quoted in Cook and Cusack, supra note 46 at 168.   
237 As cited in ibid at 166. 
238 Ciudad Juarez Report, supra note193 at ¶57. 
239 Cook and Cusack, supra note 46 at 167.   
240 Ibid.   
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seized every opportunity at its disposal to expand upon important legal obligations and 
ideas, it is nevertheless very thorough in its documentation of the events occurring in 
Ciudad Juárez, and in expressly linking gender stereotyping and GBV.  Moreover, it 
expounds the fact that Sates’ have a responsibility not to simply have information 
campaigns on the issues of GBV and gender stereotyping, but that these attempts to 
alter wrongful behaviours and attitudes must have the potential to be effective.   
What is clear from the CEDAW Committee’s jurisprudential record is that States have 
both positive and negative duties in regards to article 5 of the Convention, as well as in 
regards to GBV – States must alter the attitudes and behaviours of civil servants and 
citizens through education and awareness initiatives (as was found in the L.C. v. Peru 
complaint), and must also refrain from entrenching discriminatory gender stereotypes 
(as was found in the Vertido complaint).  States Parties must both protect and promote 
women’s human rights in all sectors and to the greatest of their abilities.  The following 
chapter will consider in greater detail States’ obligations at both the international and 
regional levels, particularly in regards to how this applies to gender stereotyping and 
GBV.   
 
IX. STATE RESPONSIBILTY 
Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed 
by them in good faith.  
– Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969241 
State responsibility at the international and regional levels has two components: firstly, 
the substantive obligations of States and, secondly, the standard to which States must 
meet these obligations. In the latter aspect, state responsibility centres on the notion of 
due diligence.  This section will focus primarily on the concept of due diligence and how 
it has been interpreted at the international and regional levels.  Before examining the 
standard of due diligence, however, we will briefly consider the substantive obligations 
of states under international law. 
                                                          
241 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) at art. 26, available: 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf, accessed 19 December 2011 
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If an instrument is binding, the substantive obligations of States are the provisions in the 
treaties to which countries are a party to.  Binding instruments are, essentially, treaties, 
and operate under the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda.  The Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties stipulates that, “every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and 
must be performed by them in good faith.”242  Non-binding instruments include 
declarations, action plans, and the like, and are non-enforceable in a legal sense.  
Nevertheless, they are important indicators of the direction states are taking in their 
interpretation of various treaties.  Another important concept, particularly when it comes 
to non-discrimination, is the international legal doctrine of jus cogens.  Jus cogens 
obligations are peremptory norms that, through state practice coupled with opinio juris, 
supersede any treaty or other agreement.243  Many have argued that non-discrimination 
is a jus cogens norm and therefore must be respected by all nations, irrespective of 
whether or not they are a State Party to a treaty.244  This is significant because if we 
conceptualize GBV as a form of discrimination, then all states would be bound by an 
obligation to eradicate GBV.  This is a broad obligation, however, and would not include 
an obligation to alter stereotypes specifically. 
If a State is a Party to a binding instrument, such as the CEDAW Convention, then it 
must respect every clause within that text, unless it has entered a valid reservation to a 
provision.  This seems straight-forward enough, but proves difficult in practice.  While 
negative obligations which arise out of treaties are relatively easy to assess in terms of 
whether or not a State is complying with its obligations, positive obligations are much 
more difficult to interpret.  In the case of altering stereotypes and behaviours that are 
discriminatory against women, there is not necessarily a quantifiable goal to work 
towards.  Stereotypes take different forms in different countries, the altering of which 
can be achieved in different ways.  It therefore makes it challenging for treaty bodies to 
determine, when a violation has been identified, whether or not a State can be held 
legally responsible for the violation.  In the case of GBV, for example, many of the 
                                                          
242 Ibid.   
243 Ibid at art. 53.   
244 See, for e.g., the discussion in Andrea Bianchi ‘Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens’ (2008) 19:3 EJIL 491 at 506. 
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perpetrators of the acts in question are private actors, over whom the state may have no 
direct control.  The standard for state responsibility has been borne out of the 
instruments themselves, as well as having been interpreted through jurisprudence at the 
regional level in particular, and has been set at the threshold of due diligence. 
DEVAW stipulates that States must “exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and, 
in accordance with national legislation, punish acts of violence against women, whether 
those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private persons.”245  Additionally, the due 
diligence standard must be exercised in good faith.246  This standard can be applied in 
regards to States’ obligations to prevent, protect, and provide compensation for the 
victims of GBV, as well as prosecuting the offenders.247  The former Special Rapporteur 
on VAW asserted in her 2006 report on the due diligence standard that the principle of 
due diligence is a rule of customary international law, due to the copious amounts of 
opino juris and state practice she outlines.248   
 
The due diligence standard, itself rather vague, has been interpreted in a more focused 
fashion by the regional human rights bodies.  In the Velásquez case, a watershed 
decision on the standard of due diligence, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
found that,  
[a]n illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly 
imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a private person or 
because the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to international 
responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of 
due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the 
Convention.249 
This means that the due diligence standard is, like the principle of non-discrimination, a 
peremptory norm under international law and must be respected by every State.  The 
                                                          
245 DEVAW, supra note 32 at art. 4(c).  
246 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ‘Velásquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, 29 July 1988, Series C: Decisions and 
Judgments, No. 04,’ as quoted in Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, 
Yakin Ertürk ‘The Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for the Elimination of Violence against Women’ (20 January 2006), available: 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G06/103/50/PDF/G0610350.pdf?OpenElement, accessed 14 October 2011 [Due 
Diligence Report].  
 
247 Ibid at ¶103. 
248 Ibid at ¶ 29.   
249 Due Diligence Report, supra note 246.   
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ECtHR has recently advanced the due diligence standard in the context of intimate 
partner violence in its Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria and Opuz v. Turkey decisions.  The 
Court named various measures through which a State can be considered to have the 
due diligence standard in order to “give practical substance to judging a state’s 
adherence to the principles of protection, investigation and prosecution.”250 These 
measures include judicial mechanisms for obtaining protection measures, and the 
availability of prosecution in the public interest for all crimes of domestic violence.  In the 
Opuz decision, the Court also held that it would recognize a state’s failure to exercise 
due diligence as GBV.251  In other words, while the State may not have been the direct 
agent perpetrating violence, it is vicariously liable for a private actor’s actions if it does 
not meet the due diligence standard.   
 
The standard of care is not one of omniscience or omnipotence, but rather one that 
requires States to fulfill their obligations to the best of their abilities.  This is important 
due to the cyclical and multi-sectoral nature of GBV.  As Prof. Lisa Davis expresses, 
[w]hen States fail to bring perpetrators to justice, they implicitly condone such 
violence, giving rise to impunity that facilitates further abuses and normalizes GBV. 
This lack of accountability leads to further endangerment for women. Furthermore, 
women begin to lose faith in the justice system as prevailing gender inequalities are 
reinforced. The State must act with due diligence in preventing violence against 
women and providing justice for women who have already suffered violence by 
implementing effective measures to ensure thorough and timely investigation, 
prosecution, and punishment, as well as by providing access to redress for 
victims.252 
Despite the preeminent importance, therefore, of meeting the due diligence standard 
and fulfilling States’ obligations to comply with the treaties they are a party to, all States 
have fallen short of their responsibilities in terms of GBV and of altering discriminatory 
stereotypes.   
 
                                                          
250 Lee Hasselbacher ‘State Obligations Regarding Domestic Violence: The European Court of Human Rights, Due Diligence, and 
International legal Minimums of Protection’ (2009) 8 Nw. U. J. Int’l Hum. Rts. 190 at 203. 
251 Ibid at 203.    
252 Post-Earthquake Rape, supra note 33 at 884.   
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X. CONCLUSION 
The development and evolution of international and regional normative frameworks that 
acknowledge, identify, and address stereotyping as an underlying cause of GBV has 
been an important step forward in the universal realization of human rights.  No State, 
no matter how powerful, wealthy or prominent, is immune to GBV, and no State should 
forget this.  Many States, however, continue to focus too much attention on the overt 
manifestation of underlying, systemic, and societal misperceptions; while prosecuting 
the perpetrators of GBV, for example, is extremely important, more attention needs to 
be paid to why some men feel that it is to some extent reasonable to violate women’s 
human rights.  Stereotyped gender roles based on antiquated notions of femininity and 
masculinity perpetuate cycles of violence, which in turn impede women’s ability to 
realize their human rights.  Altering these stereotypes should therefore remain a priority 
in States’ efforts to eradicate GBV.   
Something that is not discussed very frequently is that the stereotypes that perpetuate 
GBV are not merely those ascribed to women, but that the stereotypes associated with 
men also buttress the seemingly interminable nature of GBV.  In order to truly eradicate 
GBV and alter discriminatory stereotypes and behaviours, I posit that male stereotypes 
also need to be addressed.  As Justice Mokgoro explained in the Hugo decision, the 
stereotype of women as caregivers and men as not being as actively involved in raising 
children, prevented women from “forging identities for themselves independent of their 
roles as wives and mothers […] and denied fathers the opportunity to participate in child 
rearing.”253  The goal should be equality and the ability to choose one’s profession, 
develop a personality, and exude qualities without fear of being perceived as being 
‘unfemale’ or ‘unmale’.  In other words, a woman who chooses not to get married or 
have children should not been seen as less womanly than a woman who devotes her 
life to raising her children, just as a man who is not particularly assertive or aggressive 
should not been seen as any less manly than his counterparts.   
                                                          
253 Cook and Cusack, supra note 46 at 65. 
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Until GBV is eradicated, women will not be able to enjoy the human rights to which they 
are entitled by virtue of their humanity.  The eradication of GBV must include both top-
down and bottom-up approaches, with governments working to enforce appropriate 
legislation at the domestic level, and private citizens altering their attitudes and 
behaviours in the workplace, the community, and at home.   Stereotypes are not 
concepts which will disappear or morph overnight; it will undoubtedly be a lengthy 
process.  Fortunately, many of the normative frameworks which exist at the regional and 
international levels have recognized the significant role stereotyping plays in the 
perpetuation of GBV.  The issue of implementation, however, remains challenging.  
Stereotypes can be difficult to identify, which is why, as Cook and Cusack have pointed 
out, the use of jurisprudence to name specific stereotypes that undermine efforts to 
eradicate GBV is so important.  The ultimate objective for States, treaty bodies, and 
ordinary citizens must be to live in a world where a woman being subject to violence for 
the simple fact that she is a woman is not seen as a private matter that can be swept 
under the rug, but is seen as a despicable, reproachable and reprehensible act of 
discrimination.  We are not there yet by any stretch of the imagination, but with a strong 
normative framework in place, an increase in political will, and receptiveness from 
society more generally, perhaps more and more women will know what it is like to live in 
societies, communities, and families where they are not subject to violence, and where 
their worth is not based on motherhood and wifedom, but rather on the equal respect 
that all humans deserve.   
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